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ABSTRACT
In recent years, Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) have become a de facto choice to
accelerate the computations in various domains such as machine learning, security,
financial and scientific computing. GPUs leverage the inherent data parallelism in
the target applications to provide high throughput at superior energy efficiency.
Due to the rising usage of GPUs for a large number of applications, they are
facing new challenges, especially in the security and reliability domains. From
the security side, recently several microarchitectural attacks targeting GPUs have
been demonstrated. These attacks leak the secret information stored on GPUs,
for example, the parameters of a neural network (NN) model and the private user
information. From the reliability side, the innovations to improve GPU memory
systems are making them more susceptible to errors. My dissertation research
focuses on addressing these security and reliability challenges in GPUs while
minimizing the associated overhead of the proposed protection mechanisms.
To improve GPU security, we focus on the previously demonstrated correlation
timing attack. Such an attack exploits the deterministic nature of the coalescing
mechanism in GPUs to correlate the execution time and the number of accesses.
Consequently, an attacker can recover the encryption keys stored on GPUs.
Therefore, to counter the correlation timing attack, we first introduce a randomized
coalescing defense scheme (RCoal). RCoal randomizes the coalescing logic such that
the attacker fails to correlate the execution time and the number of accesses. As a
result, RCoal thwarts the correlation timing attack. Next, we propose a bucketing
based coalescing defense scheme, BCoal, which minimizes the variation in the
number of memory accesses by generating a predetermined number (called buckets)
of memory accesses. With low variation in the number of memory accesses, the
attacker cannot correlate the application execution time and the secret information,
thus failing the correlation timing attack. BCoal generates less memory traffic than
RCoal and, therefore, is performance efficient.
To improve GPU reliability, we address the data memory faults in GPU caches and
DRAM. Existing reliability mechanisms of redundancy and check-pointing fail to
scale with the increasing memory/computational demands on GPUs and quickly
become impractical. To address this problem, we study a wide range of applica-
tions to find that a very small fraction of the data memory is most vulnerable to
faults. This small fraction of the data is not only highly accessed but also highly
shared across GPU threads. Consequently, we propose and develop two reliability
schemes to detect-only and to detect/correct faults in this most vulnerable data
while incurring low overhead. The focus of on-going and future work is to improve
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Low-Overhead Techniques for Secure and Reliable GPU Computing
Chapter 1
Introduction
Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) provide significant performance and energy efficiency
advantages over CPUs as the former exploits the data-level parallelism in the applica-
tions [60, 5, 69, 118, 59, 61, 106, 3, 2, 12, 54, 122]. As a result, GPUs are largely deployed
to accelerate applications in various fields, such as high-performance computing (HPC),
artificial intelligence (AI), finance, virtual/augmented reality, genomics, and autonomous
vehicle workloads [23, 109, 122, 93, 116, 98, 91, 96, 103, 94].
With the increasing demand for GPUs in the computational and graphical workloads,
the challenges faced by the GPU architecture are also increasing, especially in the secu-
rity and reliability domains. For example, some of the GPU-run applications, such as
DNA and financial computing, process private user data. Furthermore, while the deep
learning workloads benefit from the computational power of GPUs, the neural network
(NN) models are under attack to steal the confidential model parameters and the private
user data processed on the GPUs [37, 81]. Also, cryptographic applications, such as AES
encryption handling sensitive data, are known to achieve significant performance benefits
IEEE Copyright Note: In reference to IEEE copyrighted material which is used with permission in this thesis,
the IEEE does not endorse any of the College of William and Mary’s products or services. Internal or personal
use of this material is permitted. If interested in reprinting/republishing IEEE copyrighted material for advertising
or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution, please go to http://www.
ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/rights_link.html to learn how to obtain a License from
RightsLink. If applicable, University Microfilms and/or ProQuest Library, or the Archives of Canada may supply
single copies of the dissertation.
2
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
from GPUs [44, 128, 72, 17, 83, 42]. As a result, the secure computations on GPUs are a
primary focus to ensure that the confidential and private data processed is not leaked by
an attacker.
Next, emerging computing needs have fueled the growth of GPU architectures. Specifi-
cally, the growing data sizes in the deep learning and AI workloads have lead to a significant
increase in the GPU storage structures [99]. Consequently, several research efforts have
been made to operate these storage structures efficiently. However, the effect of these
innovations on GPU reliability is not yet well-understood. For example, low voltage cache
designs (i.e., AMD Killi [27] or IBM Dante [11]) for managing power consumption of large
last-level caches in GPUs can increase the likelihood of multi-bit faults. Furthermore,
advanced DRAM architectures make multi-bit faults more common [120, 125]. The in-
creasing multi-bit faults in the GPU memory structures may adversely affect the output
of the applications leading to less reliable GPU computations. The reduced reliable GPU
computations, in turn, may lead to catastrophic failures, such as accidents of autonomous
vehicles [105, 16, 65, 43]. Consequently, the data memory faults in the GPU memory
structures must be addressed to ensure reliable GPU computations.
1.1 Low-Overhead Hardware Techniques for Improving
GPU Security
1.1.1 Problem Statement
As noted above, GPUs outperform CPUs in terms of performance and power efficiency
when executing cryptographic applications, such as AES encryption [42, 72, 17, 83]. How-
ever, several new correlation timing and covert channel attacks have been demonstrated
on GPUs to leak confidential and private user data [44, 80, 135, 45]. Our research focuses
on the recent correlation timing attack on GPU, which exploited the correlation between
the execution time and the number of coalesced accesses to memory to recover the AES
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encryption keys [44]. Specifically, the attacker exploits the relationship between the coa-
lesced accesses and AES encryption keys to reveal the encryption key through an offline
correlation analysis with the help of the recorded encryption execution time and encrypted
(cipher-) text.
1.1.2 Contributions
We introduce two hardware-based defense mechanisms for GPUs to mitigate the corre-
lation timing attack and prevent the leakage of security-sensitive data. The first defense
mechanism, RCoal, randomizes the memory access coalescing mechanism to generate ad-
ditional accesses to thwart the correlation timing attack [49]. For the second defense mech-
anism, we propose a bucketing-based coalescing mechanism, BCoal [50]. BCoal generates
additional memory accesses whenever necessary to match the total number of accesses
to a set of pre-determined numbers (called buckets). Consequently, BCoal reduces the
correlation between the number of accesses and private data to mitigate the correlation
timing attack. Furthermore, since BCoal generates fewer memory accesses compared to
RCoal, BCoal proves to be a performance efficient defense mechanism.
Our research on secure GPU computing through hardware techniques makes the fol-
lowing contribution:
• We analyze the correlation timing attack on GPUs to show that the regularity and
deterministic nature of the memory access coalescing is a major security vulnerability.
•We propose two novel hardware-based defense mechanisms to mitigate the correlation
timing attack leveraging the memory access coalescing. The first defense mechanism,
RCoal, randomizes the memory coalescing logic to eliminate the relationship between the
number of memory accesses and the execution time to thwart the correlation timing attack.
• Our second defense mechanism, BCoal, implements a bucketing-based coalescing
mechanism to always issue pre-determined numbers (chosen from a small set, called buck-
ets) of coalesced accesses by padding additional accesses to the real accesses whenever
necessary. As a result, the correlation between the number of accesses and the execution
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time reduces thus mitigating the correlation timing attack.
• We demonstrate through the theoretical and empirical analysis that both of our
defense mechanisms offer improved security against the correlation timing attack at a low
performance overhead. Furthermore, both defense mechanisms offer a tradeoff between
the security and performance that can be set by a user.
•We show that both, RCoal and BCoal, defense mechanisms incur a very low hardware
overhead.
1.2 Low-Overhead Hardware Techniques for Reliable GPU
Computing
1.2.1 Problem Statement
The current generation of GPUs employs an error checking and correction (ECC) mech-
anism called single error correction and double error detection (SECDED) to detect and
correct the data memory faults [58]. SECDED-ECC corrects single-bit fault and de-
tects up to two-bit faults. However, as noted earlier, with the growing error rate in the
GPU memory structures, the number of multi-bit (more than 2-bits) faults is increas-
ing [120, 125, 27, 11]. SECDED-ECC is not capable of addressing these rising multi-bit
faults and, therefore, the GPU output reliability cannot be guaranteed. A stronger ECC,
such as Chipkill, can address the multi-bit faults. However, Chipkill is not feasible to
implement on GPUs [58]. As a result, a performance efficient reliability mechanism to
address the rising multi-bit faults is needed.
1.2.2 Contributions
To devise a performance efficient reliability scheme, we adopt a data-centric approach [48].
We begin with the GPU application profiling to study how the data memory is accessed
by an application during runtime. We noted that a small fraction of the data memory is
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highly accessed and shared by the GPU threads as compared to the rest of the memory. We
call this highly accessed and shared memory as hot memory. Next, we simulate the fault
injections to study their impact on this small fraction of hot memory on GPU application
output. We note that the faults in the hot memory spread widely across GPU warp
thread instructions leading to catastrophic failures, for example, misclassifications in the
neural networks. Consequently, we conclude that the hot memory should be prioritized
to be covered under the reliability mechanism. Based on our observations, we develop
a detection-only and detection-and-correction reliability schemes to reduce GPU output
corruption.
Our research work on performance efficient reliable GPU computing makes the follow-
ing contribution:
•We perform a detailed application-level analysis to show that a small fraction of data
used by a large number of GPGPU application threads can dramatically increase their
vulnerability to multi-bit faults. This data is usually read-only and can be profiled with
low-overhead.
• We develop both detection and correction mechanisms that prioritize the reliability
of this identified critical data. Our mechanisms leverage the critical data information
obtained from the software for the partial data replication and execute checks only for
this small fraction of data.
• Our selective detection and correction mechanisms based on partial data replication
exhibit very limited overhead due to the fact that overhead of additional checks (and
associated memory accesses) can be hidden thanks to latency tolerance property of GPUs.
Quantitatively, we significantly improve GPU reliability, an average 98.97% drop in the
number of execution runs with corrupt output while incurring a low average performance
overhead of 1.2%.
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1.3 Dissertation Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of GPU
architecture, along with the memory access optimization techniques and data memory
faults and their impact. Chapter 3 introduces our first defense scheme against correlation
timing attacks which employs randomized coalescing. Chapter 4 details our bucketing-
based coalescing scheme which secures the GPU against correlation timing attacks. In
Chapter 5, we present our data-centric reliability mechanism to address the data memory
faults in GPUs. We present the initial findings of our ongoing exploration of the reliability
of the machine learning (ML) models in Chapter 6. Finally, in Chapter 7, we conclude
this dissertation and provide details of possible future research directions.
Chapter 2
A General Background on
Graphics Processing Units (GPUs)
In this chapter, we provide a general background on Graphics Processing Units (GPUs).
Specifically, we focus on the GPU memory access optimization techniques and application
execution on GPUs. We also introduce the data memory faults and their impact on GPU
applications.
2.1 Baseline GPU Architecture
Figure 2.1 shows a baseline GPU architecture. A typical GPU is comprised of a set
of processing cores known as Streaming Microprocessors (SMs) in Nvidia terminology.
Each SM is comprised of several processing elements (PEs), usually 32. To leverage the
parallelism in applications, GPUs employ a single instruction multiple thread (SIMT)
programming paradigm to launch applications on SMs. In SIMT, GPUs execute the same
set of instructions with different data on multiple threads in lockstep. These threads are
grouped in concurrent thread array (CTA) blocks and are launched on SMs. The SMs split
each CTA block into warps (usually 32 threads/warp) and process each warp individually
on the PEs. By launching multiple warps on each SM, GPUs hide memory access latency
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Figure 2.1: Overview of GPU Architecture.
by executing warps in a multiplexed manner to improve the efficiency of SMs.
To address the high bandwidth requirement of the GPU applications, GPUs employ
high-bandwidth global memory (DRAM) along with multi-level caches. Each SM on GPUs
has a private L1 cache shared across the corresponding PEs. Next, GPUs have multiple
L2 cache banks shared between all SMs connected through an interconnection network.
Finally, the L2 cache banks are connected to the off-chip DRAM through separate memory
channels.
2.2 GPU Memory Access Optimization Techniques
Memory bandwidth is one of the most performance-critical shared resources in GPUs [47,
46]. GPUs adopt several memory bandwidth optimization techniques, such as memory
access coalescing, caching and merging to reduce the number of accesses to the global
memory. In this sub-section, we provide a brief overview of these optimizations.
Access Coalescing. In GPUs, threads within a warp execute the instructions in lock-
step. For a global memory load instruction, all 32 threads within a warp execute 32 load
instructions. The coalescing unit in the LD/ST unit merges multiple memory requests
from different threads of the same warp (intra-warp coalescing) into as few cache line-
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sized coalesced memory accesses as possible. The intra-warp coalescing happens at the
sub-warp granularity, where the coalescing unit of the SM determines the coalesced ac-
cesses of the warp by examining a group of threads belonging to the same sub-warp. If the
threads of a sub-warp access data within a contiguous memory block, their requests are
coalesced together to reduce memory bandwidth consumption. The size and number of
sub-warps are typically fixed and remain the same throughout the application execution.
However, to achieve security, the coalescing mechanisms can be randomized (RCoal [49])
so that the coalesced accesses are no longer predictable to the attacker.
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Figure 2.2: Memory access coalescing in GPUs. c© 2018 IEEE.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the coalescing in baseline GPU and previously proposed ran-
domized coalescing techniques. Assume a single warp with four threads. The per-thread
addresses and the requested block addresses (BA) are shown with corresponding thread-
ids (tid) and sub-warp id (sid). In the baseline GPU, we assume a single sub-warp (sid =
0 for all threads) and hence all threads participate together in the coalescing. Since the
requests from tid 1 and 2 map to the same cache block, only three accesses are generated
( A ) to conserve the memory bandwidth.
Caching. GPUs further conserve the memory bandwidth by exploiting the temporal
and spatial locality in memory accesses across and within warps with the help of hard-
ware caches. Current GPUs employ two levels of caches, L1-cache (shared by the warps
executing on the same SM) and L2-cache (shared by the warps executing on different
SMs).
Access Merging. The coalesced memory accesses from a warp are sent to the L1-
cache. Upon cache misses, the memory accesses are logged in the miss-status holding
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registers (MSHRs). Multiple cache-missed coalesced accesses to the same cache block
from different warps on the same SM are merged (inter-warp merging) in MSHRs. Note
that as independent loads from the same warp can be issued to improve memory-level
parallelism, MSHRs also help in merging redundant accesses from the same warp (intra-
warp merging) if they are issued at different times. Another source of inter-warp merging
is via MSHRs at L2-cache, where the redundant L2-cache misses (across different SMs)
can be merged together.
2.3 Data Memory Faults in GPUs
2.3.1 Data Memory Faults and Their Impact in GPUs
GPUs are susceptible to a variety of faults due to the manufacturing process variations,
on-chip cross-talk between interconnects, alpha/neuron particle strikes, temperature vari-
ations, power supply noise, etc. [77, 125, 85, 86, 120, 121, 27]. In our research work, we
focus on memory faults in GPUs. The memory faults may cause the bits of the stored data
to flip to a different value than the original. This changed value of the data may lead to
the silent data corruption (SDC) of the GPU output, where the application is successfully
executed but results in erroneous output.
The effect of the data memory faults can be well understood when studied with respect
to application usage. GPUs are increasingly used for the machine learning applications,
such as self-driving cars, medical imaging, or computer virus detection. A data memory
fault may cause a mis-classification in the respective machine learning application. The
impact of such mis-classification itself depends upon the purpose of an application. In the
case of a self-driving car, a mis-classification due to the data memory error may lead to a
crash endangering lives and property. In the case of medical imaging, a mis-classification
may lead to misdiagnosis leading to delay in critical care of a patient.
The faults in the hardware are addressed through an on-chip error checking and cor-
rection (ECC) mechanism, which mitigates the effect of faults on the application output.
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The current generation of GPUs employs a single-bit error correction and double-bit error
detection (SECDED) ECC mechanism to address the data memory faults in the caches
and DRAM [58]. The multi-bit (more than two-bit) faults cannot be addressed in the
current generation GPUs.
2.3.2 Importance of Data Memory Faults in GPUs
Due to the increasing workload sizes, the sizes and the operating speeds of the GPU
memory are increasing rapidly. Figure 2.3 shows that the L2 cache sizes are increasing
rapidly over the generations of GPUs from the major vendors. Consequently, significant
research efforts have been made to operate the L2 cache at low voltage to achieve power
efficiency [28, 27]. However, when operated at a low voltage, the fault rate of the L2 caches





















Figure 2.3: L2 Cache size trend for Nvidia and AMD GPUs.
Next, several field studies have demonstrated that the DRAMs in GPUs are more
susceptible to multi-bit faults compared to the DRAMs in CPUs as the former uses a
weaker ECC mechanism, SECDED, while the latter uses a stronger ECC mechanism,
Chipkill [120, 121, 77]. However, the implementation of Chipkill [19] on GPUs is currently
not feasible [58].
Chapter 3





Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) are becoming an inevitable part of every computing
system because of their ability to provide fast and energy-efficient computation. Given
such ability, GPUs are also now being used to accelerate a variety of cryptographic algo-
rithms. For example, the popular Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm [78] is
known to achieve significant speedups on GPUs compared to CPUs [34, 41, 89, 66] as the
AES algorithm exposes abundant thread-level parallelism to leverage high bandwidth and
compute throughput of GPUs. With such increasing popularity of GPUs to accelerate
security-sensitive applications, it is imperative to keep GPUs secure against a variety of
side-channel attacks and other security vulnerabilities.
In this paper, we specifically focus on the correlation-based timing attacks on GPUs.
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In general, a correlation-based timing attack exploits the relationship between the secret
data and its impact on the processing time of an application: the attacker sends a large
number of data samples to calculate the correlation between the actual processing time
and the secret data. Among the guessed values for the secret data, the one leading to
the highest correlation is the actual secret data. Notably, the recent work from Jiang et
al. [44] demonstrated a correlation-based timing attack on a remote GPU server. They
exploited two observations. First, the number of coalesced memory accesses in the last
round can be deterministically calculated based on the last round private key byte and the
encrypted text. Second, the number of coalesced accesses in the last round is correlated
with the total execution time. With these two observations, an attacker can recover each
key byte by picking the value that best correlates with the recorded total execution time
from the remote GPU server1.
The goal of this paper is to design low-overhead defense mechanisms to thwart timing
attacks that exploit the memory coalescing in GPUs. To this end, a straightforward
solution is to eliminate the correlation between the number of coalesced accesses and the
total execution time by disabling the memory access coalescing mechanism completely.
However, since the memory access coalescing is one of the key features in GPUs that
optimizes the memory bandwidth consumption, the disabling of coalescing will incur a
heavy performance penalty due to increase in the number of memory accesses [61, 55, 44,
112]. To provide a better trade-off between security and performance, we propose RCoal,
a series of three tunable coalescing mechanisms to guard against correlation-based timing
attacks.
The first mechanism focuses on tuning the granularity at which threads are coalesced
together, thereby increasing the number of coalesced accesses at a finer granularity. We call
this technique as fixed-sized subwarp (FSS) defense mechanism, where the size of subwarp
determines the coalescing granularity. FSS mechanism helps to reduce the correlation
between the coalesced accesses and total execution time by reducing the variance in the
1Section 3.2 presents more details on the attack.
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coalesced accesses. Building on the first mechanism, the second mechanism focuses on
randomly changing the size of each subwarp. We call this technique as random-sized
subwarp (RSS) defense mechanism where the size of each subwarp affects the attacker’s
ability to correctly determine the number of coalesced accesses. The final mechanism
focuses on randomly changing the thread elements of each subwarp. We call this technique
as random-threaded subwarp (RTS) defense mechanism as the coalescer picks random
thread elements to form a subwarp. RTS can be applied to both FSS and RSS to further
hinder the attacker’s ability to determine the number of coalesced accesses correctly.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to thwart timing attacks in GPUs
via randomized coalescing techniques. In summary, this paper makes the following con-
tributions:
• We generalize the correlation-based timing attack on GPUs and show that the reg-
ularity and determinism in memory access coalescing is a major security vulnerability.
•We propose three novel coalescing mechanisms to mitigate the timing attacks arising
from memory access coalescing. These mechanisms revolve around carefully changing the
size, number, and thread elements of a subwarp to reduce the correlation between the
number of coalesced accesses and the total execution time.
• We present a detailed information-theoretical analysis to show that our randomized
coalescing mechanisms can improve the GPU security by 24 to 961 times. Our exten-
sive simulation results confirm the theoretical results and demonstrate that the improved
security can be achieved at a performance loss of 5 to 28%.
•We propose a new metric called RCoal Score that provides an opportunity for hard-
ware engineers to tune the security and performance trade-off as per their requirements.
We discuss two such security-performance trade-off designs and conclude that RSS and
RTS mechanisms provide significant advantages towards performance and security, respec-
tively.
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3.2 Background
In this section, we briefly introduce a) the baseline GPU architecture and the process of
memory access coalescing, b) the anatomy of AES encryption, and c) the baseline timing
attack assumed in this paper.
3.2.1 Baseline GPU Architecture
Overview. Figure 3.1 shows a high-level schematic of the GPU architecture. A typical
GPU consists of multiple cores, called as streaming multiprocessors (SMs) in NVIDIA
terminology. Each SM takes advantage of the Single Instruction, Multiple Threads (SIMT)
programming paradigm [54] to schedule multiple threads on its processing elements (PEs).
These threads are scheduled at the granularity of a warp, which is essentially a collection
of (usually 32) individual threads that execute a single instruction on the PEs in a lock
step manner. Each SM can execute multiple warps concurrently in a multiplexed manner
to hide the long global memory latencies and improve the utilization of core resources (e.g.,
register file, scratchpad memory). All SMs are connected to global memory partitions via
an on-chip interconnect. In this paper, we evaluate the proposed techniques on a GPU
architecture simulated using a cycle accurate GPU simulator – GPGPU-Sim [6]. More
details on the simulated architecture are given in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Key configuration parameters of the simulated GPU configuration. c© 2018
IEEE.
Core Features 1400MHz core clock, SIMT width = 32 (16 × 2)
Resources / Core 32KB shared memory, 32KB register file, 15 SMs
32 threads/warp, one subwarp per coalescing unit
Features immediate post dominator based branch divergence handling
Memory Model 6 GDDR5 Memory Controllers (MCs), FR-FCFS scheduling
16 DRAM-banks, 4 bank-groups/MC, 924 MHz
memory clock Global linear address space is
interleaved among partitions in chunks of 256 bytes
Hynix GDDR5 Timing [39], tCL = 12, tRP = 12, tRC = 40,
tRAS = 28, tCCD = 2, tRCD = 12, tRRD = 6
Interconnect 1 crossbar/direction,
1400MHz interconnect clock, islip VC and switch allocators
Memory Access Coalescing. One of the effective ways to improve the collective perfor-
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Figure 3.1: Overview of Baseline GPU Architecture. c© 2018 IEEE.
mance of the concurrently executing threads on GPUs is to optimize the global memory
bandwidth. To this end, several techniques such as intra-warp memory access coalescing,
inter- and intra-warp request merging via miss status handling registers (MSHRs), sec-
toring [112], and L1/L2 caching have been proposed for GPUs. In this work, we focus on
intra-warp memory access coalescing technique, which merges multiple memory requests
from different threads of the same warp in to as few cache line sized coalesced memory
accesses as possible.
The coalescing unit (part of LD/ST unit of the SM) performs the agglomeration of
memory requests from the threads in a warp at a subwarp level, where the number of
subwarps is an architectural parameter. If the threads of a particular subwarp request
nearby data within a contiguous block of the memory, their requests are coalesced together
to avoid redundant accesses. Therefore, if the memory access size, subwarp size, and
thread-data pattern (e.g., if/when thread to table index mapping is known) are known,
the number of memory accesses can be calculated accurately. As per CUDA programming
guide [95], the scalar threads from the same warp can be coalesced together (subwarp size
of 1), at a half-warp basis (subwarp size of 2) or at a quarter-warp basis (subwarp size of
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4). The subwarp size is decided based on the size of the memory request from each thread.
The generated coalesced accesses are serviced at the rate that matches with the underlying
cache/memory bandwidth. To correctly simulate the number of coalesced accesses as that
of in the baseline attack model (explained later in the section), we assume subwarp size
to be 1 in our baseline architecture.
To understand the effect of subwarps on coalescing, consider an example with warp
comprising of four threads under two different cases employing the number of subwarps
(num-subwarp) as 1 and 2, respectively, as shown in Figure 3.2. We assume that four
threads generate four accesses and if perfectly coalesced will generate one coalesced access
(memory block). When all the threads are considered together for coalescing (i.e., Case 1:
num-subwarp is 1), only three coalesced accesses are generated as the requests from the
second and third thread are coalesced into one request. When num-subwarp is 2 (Case 2),
the coalescing is performed independently for each subwarp. Consequently, two coalesced
accesses per subwarp (in total four) are generated.
3.2.2 AES Encryption
Basics. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [78] is a widely used symmetric-
key algorithm. The AES standard specifies 128, 192, and 256 bits as the standard key
lengths. Without losing generality, we focus on AES-128, which employs a 128-bit key to
encrypt the plaintext. AES-128 algorithm consists of 10 rounds each with its own round
key of 16 bytes, which is generated from the encryption key. In each round, subBytes()
transformation (details of other transformation can be found in prior works on AES [34,
41, 89, 66]) performs a table look-up operation on the substitution (S-box) table. In the
last round, a table look-up operation is performed on the T4 S-box table followed by bitwise
XOR operation with the last round key. This operation is expressed by Equation 3.1 for
the jth byte of output ciphertext (cj) and i
th input state of the last round (ti, table lookup
index) [34, 44]. T4 [ ] represents the last round S-box table look-up operation whose result
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Figure 3.2: Effect of subwarps on memory coalescing. c© 2018 IEEE.
is XORed with jth byte of the last round key (kj).
cj = T4 [ti]⊕ kj (3.1)
GPU Implementation of AES Encryption. A CUDA implementation of AES divides
the plaintext across multiple parallel threads to improve GPU throughput. Each thread
performs encryption on one line (block) of the plaintext. Therefore, each warp consists of
32 threads performing 32 different encryptions. The line to thread mapping is sequential
and deterministic in the baseline implementation. If the size of the plaintext exceeds
32 lines, then it is divided sequentially among several warps. For example, a plaintext
with 1024 lines will employ 32 warps each executing 32 lines of the plaintext. Figure 3.3
shows the encryption process for the last round on 32 threads of a single warp. Each
thread performs encryption of a byte (pj) of the input text, where j varies from 1 to 16.
All threads of the warp work in a lock-step manner and perform the same table look up
operation (T4 [ti]) with different values of ti. The accesses are coalesced together by the
coalescing unit, and when the replies come back, all threads use the same last round key
(kj) to generate one column of the ciphertext cj as per Equation 3.2. In Equation 3.2, tid
is the thread index.













































































Figure 3.3: Last round execution of AES-128 algorithm. The ti in T4[ti] represents the
index of the table lookup operation. kj and cj represent the jth byte of the last round






3.2.3 Baseline Timing Attack
In this paper, we use the correlation timing attack proposed by Jiang et al. [44] as the
baseline attack. The attack model assumes that the attacker sends a large number of
plaintexts to a remote GPU AES encryption server. The attacker collects the ciphertexts
and records the total execution time for each plaintext. The goal is to correctly find all 16
last round key bytes by exploiting a key observation that there is a high correlation between
the number of memory accesses and the total execution time on GPU. The baseline attack
targets the last round key since it is the most vulnerable round and key expansion is
invertible (i.e., it is possible to derive the original private key from any round key) [82].
The observation is that each table lookup index in the last round can be computed from a
byte of the last round key (kj) and the corresponding byte of ciphertext (cj), independent
of other ciphertext bytes (as shown in Equation 3.3). Thus, the attacker is able to observe
the security leakage separately at per-byte level.
ti = T
−1
4 [cj ⊕ kj ] (3.3)
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(a) Guessing the Coalesced Accesses from the Table Look up Indices
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(b) Guessing the Last Round Key
Figure 3.4: Overview of the process of guessing one of the correct last round key byte
(kj). A
m,n
j is the number of memory requests for m
th guess of the jth last round key byte
using nth plaintext. n varies between 1 to N, where N is the number of plaintext samples.
m varies from 0 to 255 and j varies from 1 to 16. c© 2018 IEEE.
Figure 3.4 shows the attack process for recovering the jth last round key byte (kj). The
attack process has two major steps. The first step involves a guessed key value kmj where
m ranges from 0 to 255. According to Equation 3.3, the table lookup index of each thread
(ttid,mi ) can be computed, as shown in Figure 3.4a. Once the indices are obtained for
all threads, the attacker can calculate the expected number of coalesced accesses (Am,nj )
for the nth plaintext with the known and deterministic behavior of coalescing (in our
configuration, 16 consecutive table elements are mapped sequentially to the same memory
block). This particular attack assumes num-subwarp to be 1 (i.e., all threads in the warp
are processed together for coalescing). This first step is repeated for all possible 256 key
byte guesses for the jth byte and for N plaintext samples. As a result, a memory access
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Figure 3.5: Relationship between Last Round and Total Execution Time. c© 2018 IEEE.
matrix is generated as shown in Figure 3.4b. Each row of the matrix corresponds to the
number of guessed memory accesses for a particular key guess (m) across N plaintext
samples (Amj ).
The second step involves calculating the correlation between each row (key guess) of
the memory access matrix with the last round execution time (E) to encrypt each plaintext
(collected by the attacker). Since both the total and last round execution time correlate
with last round coalesced accesses (shown in Figure 3.5), the guessed key value (α) is
correct for kj if it has the maximum correlation value (corr
α
j ) with E. For the rest of the
paper, we assume a stronger attack with the capability of accessing last round execution
time as compared to the realistic attack, which is weaker due to the noise in the total
execution time.
3.3 Motivation and Goals
The primary reason behind the success of the baseline correlation timing attack is the
deterministic behavior of memory access coalescing that allows accurate calculation of
the coalesced accesses generated. To verify this on our GPGPU-Sim based simulation
environment, we plot the correlation values (corrmj ) of all 256 possible values of m for 0
th
key byte (k0, j=0). We calculate this correlation value between the coalesced accesses
from the attack and the execution time of the last round of AES-128. From Figure 3.6a,
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we observe that the correlation value is the highest (highlighted in red and encircled) for
the correct value of the 0th key byte among all other guess values. We observe this trend
for all 16 last round key bytes indicating that we can successfully guess all of them.
As a first step towards defending against the baseline attack, we aim to eliminate the
relationship between the number of coalesced accesses and the last round execution time
by disabling the coalescing mechanism. As a result, the number of coalesced accesses will
always be 32 (i.e., the worst case scenario) from a warp with 32 threads. We executed the
same baseline attack with coalescing disabled to find that there is no correlation between
the number of coalesced accesses and the last round execution time. Consequently, we
could not successfully guess any of the key byte. Figure 3.6b shows the plot of correlation
values against the possible values of the 0th key byte. The correlation of the correct key
byte is very close to zero, so as that of other key guesses.
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Figure 3.6: Effect of Coalescing on the Recovery of 0th Last Round Key Byte (k0): a)
Recovery is Successful when Coalescing is Enabled, b) Recovery is Unsuccessful when
Coalescing is Disabled. c© 2018 IEEE.
Although disabling the coalescing is an effective technique to defend against the base-
line correlation timing attack, absence of memory access coalescing degrades the GPU
performance and energy efficiency significantly [61, 55, 44, 112]. Our own experiments
show that the performance degrades by up to 178% for AES-128 algorithm encrypting
plaintext of 1024 lines. Also, the data movement (i.e., the number of memory accesses)
increases by 2.7×. Therefore, disabling the coalescing is not an attractive solution from
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the perspective of GPU efficiency.
In this paper, our goal is to design randomized coalescing techniques to carefully bal-
ance the security and performance trade-offs. Our techniques exploit two primary short-
comings of the GPU AES implementation that lead to the successful correlation timing
(baseline) attack. First, all threads of a warp are grouped in a single subwarp for coalesc-
ing. As a result, the calculation of number of coalesced accesses becomes straightforward:
a) determine the requested table look up indices, and then b) given that the table ele-
ments are sequentially mapped to the memory blocks and the size of each block is known,
determine the number of memory blocks (coalesced accesses) required. Second, because
all threads of the warp were considered together for coalescing, the order in which the
threads are grouped together had no impact on the coalescing. However, if coalescing is
performed at a subwarp-level (with number of subwarp being more than one), the order
of grouping the threads would affect the total number of coalesced accesses depending on
which threads fall into the same subwarp. To address these two shortcomings, we focus
on the following three randomized coalescing aspects to weaken the correlation between
the coalesced accesses calculated by the baseline attack and the execution time from the
encryption.
• Number of Subwarps: We choose the number of subwarps that is unknown to
the baseline attacker. The benefit of using subwarps is that the attacker may not be able
to correctly estimate the number of coalesced accesses. Further, with a large number
of subwarps, the variance in the number of coalesced accesses decreases, entailing more
number of plaintext samples to establish a weak correlation. This weak correlation reduces
the information leakage over the timing channels. We call this defense mechanism as Fixed
Subwarp Size (FSS), as the size of subwarp chosen by the defense mechanism is fixed.
• Size of Subwarps: In case the attacker knows the number of subwarps (or calcu-
lates it based on the timing information), we aim to increase the strength of the defense
mechanism by randomizing the number of threads per subwarp such that the total num-
ber of threads per warp still remains 32. This randomness makes the number of coalesced
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accesses harder to estimate (same reasoning as FSS) even if the number of subwarps is
known to the attacker. We call this defense mechanism as Random Subwarp Size (RSS)
as the size of each subwarp is chosen randomly.
• Thread Elements of Subwarps: Our last mechanism is focused on further en-
hancing the GPU security by randomizing the thread elements of each subwarp (Random-
threaded Subwarp (RTS)). It introduces additional randomness in the number of coalesced
accesses generated. Note that RTS can be combined with both FSS and RSS defense
mechanisms.
3.4 Subwarp based Defense Mechanisms
In this section, we discuss a series of subwarp-based defense mechanisms that are designed
to weaken the deterministic memory coalescing logic in GPUs. By doing so, the baseline
attack that leverages the knowledge of memory coalescing logic will find it difficult to
correctly guess the last round key bytes, thereby improving the security of the GPU-based
systems.
3.4.1 Fixed-sized Subwarps (FSS)
In the baseline attack, the attacker assumes that the number of subwarps (num-subwarp)
is 1, and hence, all threads are processed together for coalescing. In our first defense
mechanism, fixed size subwarps (FSS), we break this assumption by choosing a value of
num-subwarp that is unknown to the attacker. In order to understand the impact of
num-subwarp on performance, consider Figure 3.7a. We find that the total execution time
increases with increase in the value of num-subwarp. It is because a large num-subwarp
leaves few threads for being coalesced together thereby reducing coalescing possibilities
across the threads within a warp. This leads to increased number of coalesced accesses
resulting in the performance loss.
Advantages of FSS. Although FSS has disadvantage in terms of performance, we find
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Figure 3.7: Performance of FSS enabled AES with respect to number of subwarps: a)
Execution Time and Total Memory Accesses per plaintext with increasing number of
subwarps, b) Average of correlations between the last round execution time and the last
round memory accesses for all key bytes. The last round memory accesses are calculated
assuming correct values of a key byte and the number of subwarps for coalescing to be
one. c© 2018 IEEE.
that such a mechanism can improve the GPU security against the baseline attack. It is
because a value of num-subwarp other than 1 will generate different number of coalesced
accesses than the baseline attack, which assumes num-subwarp to be 1. Therefore, the
attacker will find it hard to guess the correct key byte as the correlation between the
estimated number of coalesced accesses and the execution time reduces. To understand
this further, we evaluate FSS-enabled GPU under the baseline attack. Figure 3.7b shows
the average correlations for the correct guesses of all 16 key bytes of the last round key.
As expected, we observe that the correlation between the last round execution time and
coalesced accesses calculated from the attack reduces with the increase in the value of
num-subwarp. Therefore, a high number of samples would be required to correctly guess
the last round keys depending on the num-subwarp value.
Limitations of FSS. We evaluate the security of FSS mechanism when the attacker
knows or correctly calculates the value of num-subwarp. For example, the calculation can
be done based on the significant execution time differences across num-subwarp values
(Figure 3.7). By repeatably measuring the execution time for encryption for a plaintext,
an attacker can determine which num-subwarp is used by the remote GPU server. We call
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this new attack as “FSS Attack”, where the attacker first calculates the number of last
round coalesced accesses generated per subwarp. Next, since the last round execution time
correlates with the last round coalesced accesses across a complete warp, the attacker sums
up the last round coalesced accesses across all subwarps in a warp. Algorithm 1 illustrates
the steps to calculate the number of last round coalesced accesses per warp.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for FSS attack to calculate the number of last round coalesced
accesses for a given key byte guess while considering num-subwarp.
kj ← guess value
last round mem accesses← 0
for i = 0→ num-subwarp do
mem accesses subwarp[i]← 0
for grp = 0→ num-subwarp do




% comment: line represents plaintext line
% comment: LEN represents the total number of lines in the plaintext





holder[T4−1[cipher[line][j]⊕ kj ] >> 4] + +
for i = 0→ 32
num-subwarp
do
if holder[i]! = 0 then
mem accesses subwarp[grp] + +
for i = 1→ num-subwarp do
if mem accesses subwarp[i]! = 0 then
last round mem accesses← last round mem accesses+mem accesses subwarp[i]
We evaluate the effectiveness of FSS-enabled GPU under the FSS-attack in Figure
3.8, which illustrates that the attacker is able to establish a high correlation between the
number of coalesced accesses and the last round execution time using the FSS attack.
Using Algorithm 1, the attacker can calculate the last round memory accesses across
the whole warp as observed during the encryption. Therefore, the attacker can establish
a high correlation between the calculated number of last round coalesced accesses and
the observed last round execution time to successfully recover the last round key. For
num-subwarp = 32 (not shown), the variation in the numbers of last round coalesced
accesses generated across all plaintexts drops to 0. Subsequently, the correlation between
the number of last round coalesced accesses from Algorithm 1 and the observed last
round execution time also drops to 0. Therefore, FSS enabled GPU is immune to the
correlation timing attacks only when num-subwarp = 32 but at the cost of performance.
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In summary, we conclude that the stand alone FSS-enabled GPU cannot provide adequate
security against the generalized correlation timing attacks. Therefore, improved defense
mechanisms are required.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300














(a) num-subwarp = 2
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
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(c) num-subwarp = 8
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(d) num-subwarp = 16
Figure 3.8: Fixed Size Subwarp (FSS) mechanism against FSS attack. c© 2018 IEEE.
3.4.2 Random-sized Subwarp (RSS)
In Random-sized Subwarp (RSS) defense mechanism, the size of each subwarp is randomly
chosen by the hardware. It implies that the coalescing unit considers different numbers
of threads per subwarp for coalescing together. This results in increased randomness in
the number of last round coalesced accesses generated per warp leading to reduction in
correlation. We consider two distributions to generate sizes of subwarps: normal and
skewed. Figure 3.9 shows these distributions for 1000 plaintexts and with the assumption
of num-subwarp = 4. In the normal distribution case, the mean of the distribution is
close to that of the FSS scenario (32/num-subwarp). According to empirical results (not
shown), this implies that security and performance of RSS with normal distribution is
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Figure 3.9: Subwarp size distribution of RSS for num-subwarp = 4. c© 2018 IEEE.
In order to improve security and performance over FSS, we consider skewed size dis-
tribution for the RSS mechanism that leads to significant differences in the subwarp sizes.
This has two benefits. First, due to the mismatch in the subwarp sizes, the attacker will
find it hard to correctly calculate the last round coalesced accesses using Algorithm 1.
Second, the skewed distribution also results in an improved performance, since the op-
portunities for coalescing increases with the subwarp size. Further, we ensure that the
skewed distribution considers all possible subwarp size combinations equally likely and no
subwarp is empty (a formalization can be found in Section 3.5.2.3). In summary, we use
skewed distribution for RSS to improve security and performance.
3.4.3 Random-threaded Subwarp (RTS)
In addition to the size and number of subwarps, we consider an additional level of random-
ness that comes from the choice of threads that form a particular subwarp. By random
allocation of the threads to different subwarps, we eliminate the in-order mapping of
threads to the subwarp. We find that such random formation of subwarps significantly
changes the number of expected coalesced accesses as the threads processed for coalescing
in a subwarp are chosen randomly. We define this technique as Random-threaded Subwarp
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Figure 3.10: Effects of different defense mechanisms on coalescing for num-subwarp =
2: a) FSS+RTS and b) RSS+RTS. sid represents subwarp id and tid represents thread
id. c© 2018 IEEE.
RTS can be applied on top of both FSS and RSS, called as FSS+RTS and RSS+RTS,
respectively. Extending the example used in Section 3.2.1 to study the impact of subwarps
on coalescing, Figures 3.10a and 3.10b illustrate examples of FSS+RTS and RSS+RTS
with 4 threads and 2 subwarps, respectively. In the case of FSS+RTS, the size of both
subwarps is 2 but threads are not mapped in order. For example, subwarp 0 (sid = 0) has
two threads 0 and 2 (tid = 0 and 2) instead of threads 0 and 1. Therefore, four coalesced
accesses are generated. In the case of RSS+RTS, sizes of the subwarp are different: 1 and
3. Consequently, the mapping of one of threads is changed (i.e., tid = 0 is now mapped
to sid = 1) leading to total three coalesced accesses. In summary, we find that RSS can
help in reducing the number of coalesced accesses while providing randomness (along with
RTS) for better security.
3.4.4 Implementation Details
In order to implement the proposed subwarp based defense mechanisms, we modify the
coalescing unit to allow flexibility in processing of threads for memory access coalescing.
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Figure 3.11 shows a schematic of the memory coalescing unit (MCU) of GPU (the ad-
ditional hardware logic for security is shaded). As described by Leng et al. [61], each
MCU contains a multi-entry pending request table (PRT). Each entry in the PRT table
stores the thread index (tid), the base and offset addresses of the memory requests from
the threads, and their sizes. An entry is logged when a memory request is issued from a
thread. We add an additional subwarp-id (sid) field to identify which threads should be
coalesced together. The subwarp-id and thread-id mapping is set by the hardware logic
at the beginning of the application execution and does not change during the execution.
The logic is dependent on the adopted defense mechanism. In case of FSS and RSS, the
bits are set based on the chosen value of num-subwarp and the sizing mechanism. The
subwarp-ids are allotted in order, that is, first group of threads will belong to the first
subwarp with sid set to 0 and so on. For RTS, the available sids are allotted randomly
to the threads in a warp. The additional hardware overhead of our mechanisms is related
to the addition of subwarp-id field to each PRT entry. The number of concurrent warp
scheduler per SM in our case is two. Therefore, for each SM, the nominal overhead would
be 32 × 2 × 5 bits (to represent 32 maximum possible values of sid) = 320 bits.
3.4.5 Corresponding Attacks
Similar to the FSS attack, which generalized our baseline attack, we assumed that the
attacker is aware of the details of our defense mechanisms implemented on GPU. Therefore,
for each defense mechanism, we modified Algorithm 1 to mimic the respective defense
mechanism on the attacker’s side. For example, against the RSS+RTS enabled GPU,
the corresponding attack algorithm simulates RSS-like subwarp size distribution along
with random allocation of threads to subwarps within a warp as in RTS. We assume
corresponding attacks in the rest of the paper.




















































































Figure 3.11: Modified Coalescing Unit to realize FSS, RSS, and RTS defense mechanisms.
The additional hardware required is the field to store subwarp-id (sid) for each thread.
c© 2018 IEEE.
3.5 Theoretical Security Analysis
3.5.1 Analytical Model
To measure the security strength of the defense mechanisms introduced in Section 3.4,
we inspect a natural metric of the (expected) number of samples needed to successfully
launch the correlation timing attack.
To estimate that, we use T to represent the measurement vector, a vector of the
encryption times for a sample set using the actual key. For the jth last round key byte kj ,
we use Ûkmj to represent the estimation vector of k
m
j , a vector of the coalesced accesses for
the same sample set if 0 ≤ m ≤ 255 were the actual value of kj . The correlation attack
essentially tries to find the value m̂ that maximizes the correlation with the measure
vector:
m̂ = arg max
m
(ρ(T, Ûkmj ))
We follow the derivation in [76, 124] to estimate the number of needed samples, S, for
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a successful attack as follows:





))2 ≈ 2× Z2α
ρ2(T, Û)
(3.4)
where Û is a short hand for Ûkm̂j
, ρ represents the correlation and Zα is the quantile of the
standard normal distribution for α, the desired success rate of an attack. With α = 0.99,
2×Z2α is approximately 11. Zα is proportional to α. So the smaller α is, the smaller S is
(i.e., fewer samples are needed).
To estimate ρ2(T, Û), we observe that (as shown in Figure 3.5) the total execution
time of AES is proportional to the number of last-round coalesced accesses. Hence, we
can draw on the latter in the analytical model2. Hence, let us assume that U is the actual
vector of number of coalesced accesses from the lookup of table T4 with respect to the key












where µ and σ, as standard, respectively represent the mean and standard deviation of a
random variable. The last equation is true since U and Û are identically distributed.
3.5.2 Analysis of Defense Mechanisms
To make the analysis general, we assume there are in total M subwarps and N threads.
Moreover, we assume that each lookup table may map to R memory blocks. As discussed
in Section 3.2, our configuration has N = 32 and R = 16.
We first define three useful definitions.
Definition 1 Given m threads, if each thread accesses one of n memory blocks in a uni-
2We note that using the number of coalesced accesses rather than the execution time assure a lower
bound on the number of samples since the later is noisier than the former.
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form way, then the number of coalesced accesses, Nm,n, obeys the following distribution:




















represents the ways of partitioning m threads into i non-empty subsets; n!(n−i)! ,
i-permutations of n, represents the ways of forming i non-empty subsets from n memory
blocks.
It is infeasible to compute Equation (3.5) by enumerating all possible mappings from
threads to memory blocks since there are in total RN possibilities (1632 = 2128 when
N = 32 and R = 16). However, we note that with RTS, the number of coalesced accesses
only depends on the frequency of the R memory blocks, which is defined as follows.
Definition 2 For R memory blocks and n threads, we define a frequency set F as
{(f1, . . . , fR) | f1 + · · ·+ fR = n}
where fi ∈ F represents the frequency of accessing the i-th memory block among the n
threads.
Given a frequency vector F ∈ F , we note that the “contribution” of each memory
block to the number of last-round coalesced accesses U is independent. Hence,
Definition 3 Given a frequency sequence F ∈ F and a vector C = {c1, · · · , cm} that
specifies the capacity of each subwarp, if each thread uniformly accesses one of the |F |










where Cmn denotes the binomial coefficient and S =
∑
1≤j≤n cj.




/CSfi is the probability that the j-th subwarp is empty and µ(MF,R) is the
sum of the expectations for each subwarp and each memory block.
Next, we derive the (normalized) samples needed for a successful attack for each de-
fense mechanism. We skip the theoretical analysis for the RSS mechanism since it requires
enumerating all possible mappings from threads to memory blocks rather than the fre-
quency set, making it infeasible for the calculation. Instead, we provide the empirical
results for the RSS mechanism in Section 3.6.
3.5.2.1 FSS
With sufficiently random plaintexts, the probability that one thread accesses one of the R
memory blocks is 1/R. Hence, for each subwarp with size N/M , the number of coalesced
accesses is NN/M,R. Since each subwarp is independent, we have
µ(U) = M × µ(NN/M,R) σ(U) = M × σ(NN/M,R)
For µ
U×Û , we note that given any sequence of memory blocks being accessed by
threads, U is identical to Û . Hence, µ(U × Û) = µ(U2) = σ2(U) + µ2(U).
3.5.2.2 FSS+RTS
The random permutation does not affect µ(U) and σ(U). For µ(U × Û), (U |F ) and (Û |F )
are independent and identical for any F ∈ F . Hence, the term is equivalent to
∑
F∈F
P (F )µ2(U |F ) (3.6)
Here, P (F ) is the probability of seeing the frequency vector F . Among all RN combina-
tions of N memory accesses, Cf1N C
f2






match F . Hence,
we have P (F ) = (N)!Πfi∈Ffi!
× 1
RN
. Moreover, µ(U |F ) is the same as µ(MF,{N/M,··· ,N/M})
since each subwarp has size N/M .
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3.5.2.3 RSS+RTS
We use Ui to represent the coalesced accesses of the i-th subwarp. With RSS, Ui and Uj
are not independent. Hence, we cannot compute σ(U) as for FSS.
However, given the size of each subwarp, Ui and Uj are independent for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤
M . We use W = {(w1, · · · , wM ) |
∑
1≤i≤M wi = N ∧ ∀1≤i≤M . wi 6= 0} to denote all
possible non-empty sizes of subwarps under RSS. Due to uniformity, P (W ) = 1|W| for any
W ∈ W.
For µ(U), we have µ(U) =
∑
W∈W P (W )µ(U |W ) =
∑
W∈W P (W )
∑
wi∈W µ(Ui|wi)











σ2(Ui|wi) + µ2(U |W )
)
Here, σ2(Ui|wi) = µ(U2i |wi) − µ2(Ui|wi) and µ(U |W ) =
∑
1≤i≤M µ(Ui|wi) due to inde-
pendence. We note that (Ui|wi) is Nwi,R and (U2i |wi) is (Nwi,R)
2. So these terms can be
computed via Definition 1.
For µ(U × Û), we can reuse Equation 3.6 since with RTS, (U |F ) and (Û |F ) are in-
dependent and identical. Similar to FSS+RTS, µ(U |F ) =
∑
W∈W P (W )µ(MF,W ) in this
case.
3.5.3 Results
Table 3.2: Security analysis results with N = 32 and R = 16, where N is the number of
threads and R is the number of memory blocks. Here, M is the number of subwarps and
S is the number of samples normalized to FSS with M = 1 case. c© 2018 IEEE.
ρ S (normalized)
M FSS FSS+RTS RSS+RTS FSS FSS+RTS RSS+RTS
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 1
2 1.00 0.41 0.20 1 6 25
4 1.00 0.20 0.15 1 24 42
8 1.00 0.09 0.11 1 115 78
16 1.00 0.03 0.05 1 961 349
32 0.00 0.00 0.00 ∞ ∞ ∞
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We use a Python script to compute the correlation and normalized sample size for a
successful attack. The results are summarized in Table 3.2.
As expected, when M = 32, we have ρ = 0 and S = ∞ because in this case, each
thread is mapped to one subwarp and hence, U = 32 regardless of the last-round key.
Otherwise, FSS is the least secure (ρ = 1, S = 1), where the key can be revealed easily
(as shown in Figure 3.8). For both FSS+RTS and RSS+RTS, increasing the number
of subwarps reduces ρ and increases S. We note that FSS+RTS is more secure than
RSS+RTS for M = 8 and 16 though the latter adds randomness to the subwarp size. We
hypothesize the reason for this improved security is that one of the subwarps has large
size under RSS+RTS most of the times (see, Figure 3.9). In this case, the correlation
between measurement vector and estimation vector is higher than that under FSS+RTS.
Moreover, the empirical results are consistent with the evaluation (Section 3.6).
Since, in practice, the attacker may observe only the noisy total execution time rather
than the last-round coalesced accesses as assumed for the theoretical analysis, the absolute
value of needed samples for a successful attack is very large. We note that the FSS
mechanism with M = 1 is the same as the (baseline) architecture used in [44]. As reported
in [44], one million timing samples are needed (if the timing data measured is clean) in
this case, and the samples can be collected within 30 minutes. Hence, we estimate that
under FSS+RTS with M = 16, around one billion samples (refer Table 3.2) are needed for
a successful attack. Although such an attack is theoretically possible, it is not practical
since collecting timing samples alone may take (30 minutes ∗ 961 ≈) 20 days.
3.6 Experimental Analysis of Security and Performance
In this section, we present empirical results to support the theoretical results discussed
in Section 3.5. We first analyze the security of each mechanism by assessing the key
recovery ability using the scatter plots and by inspecting the reduction in the correlation
values. Subsequently, we discuss the effects of the proposed mechanisms on performance
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and data movement. All the results are collected on a GPU architectural simulator,
GPGPU-Sim [6]. Note that it is impractical to execute the attack experiments with a
large number of plaintexts on a simulator. However, because of the less noisy environment
in the simulators compared to the real hardware, we were able to demonstrate the baseline
attack with 100 plaintext samples (each with 32 lines) in Section 3.3. Therefore, for a fair
comparison, we use the same number of samples to demonstrate the effectiveness of our
defense mechanisms.
3.6.1 Effect on Security
FSS+RTS Attack on FSS+RTS enabled GPU. Figure 3.12 shows four scatter plots
each with a different value of num-subwarp. Each scatter plot shows the correlation values
between the last round execution time and the number of last round coalesced accesses
calculated from the FSS+RTS attack algorithm for all the guessed values of the key byte
0. We notice that as num-subwarp increases the last round key byte recovery gets difficult
as opposed to the standalone FSS defense mechanism. This enhancement in the security
is due to the random noise added by the RTS mechanism. Although the FSS+RTS attack
implements the random thread allocation in the attack algorithm, it is hard to correctly
match the thread allocation order to the one used during the encryption. We conclude that
the randomization in the thread allocations allows FSS+RTS to improve GPU security.
RSS Attack on RSS enabled GPU. Figure 3.13 shows four scatter plots each with a
different value of num-subwarp. Each scatter plot shows the correlation values between the
last round execution time and the number of last round coalesced accesses calculated from
the RSS attack algorithm for all the guessed values of the key byte 0. For num-subwarp
greater than 2, we observe that the key byte recovery is difficult as the correlation value
for the correct guess is no longer the highest. The drop in the correlation value against the
RSS attack is due to the random nature of the subwarp sizing employed in RSS defense
mechanism. This random subwarp sizing is changed between the plaintexts and is hard
to mimic during the correlation timing attack. Therefore, with the random sizing of the
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Figure 3.12: FSS+RTS defense mechanism against FSS+RTS attack. c© 2018 IEEE.
subwarps, the RSS defense mechanism offers improved security as compared to the FSS
defense mechanism.
RSS+RTS Attack on RSS+RTS enabled GPU. Figure 3.14 shows four scatter plots
each with a different value of num-subwarp. Each scatter plot shows the correlation values
between the last round execution time and the number of last round coalesced accesses
calculated from the RSS+RTS attack algorithm for all the guessed values of the key byte
0. Similar to FSS+RTS and RSS defense mechanisms, we notice that the recovery of
the correct value of the key byte is difficult with the RSS+RTS defense mechanism for
num-subwarp greater than 2. The RSS+RTS leverages the randomness in the subwarp
sizing and in the thread allocation to the subwarps, which is very difficult to replicate in
the RSS+RTS attack. We conclude that RSS+RTS offers security benefits over the FSS
defense mechanism.
Security Comparisons. Figure 3.15 compares the security offered by the different de-
fense mechanisms proposed in this work using the average correlation. As noted in Section
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Figure 3.13: RSS defense mechanism against RSS attack.
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(d) num-subwarp = 16
Figure 3.14: RSS+RTS defense mechanism against RSS+RTS attack. c© 2018 IEEE.
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Figure 3.15: Comparison between the security offered by FSS, FSS+RTS, RSS and
RSS+RTS based on the average of correlations between the last round coalesced accesses
for all key bytes and the last round execution time observed during the encryption. The
last round coalesced accesses are calculated using the corresponding attacks. c© 2018
IEEE.
3.4, the FSS defense mechanism fails to reduce the correlation as the FSS attack can cor-
rectly calculate the last round coalesced accesses. For FSS+RTS, RSS and RSS+RTS
defense mechanisms, we observe a decrease in correlation for num-subwarp = 2 and 4. We
observe slight fluctuations in the respective correlations for RSS and RSS+RTS defense
mechanisms for num-subwarp = 8 and 16 due to increased randomness in the coalescing.
This randomness affects the incorrect guesses of the key bytes as well and results in an
overall improved security. Also, we notice that RSS+RTS outperforms all other defense
mechanisms for num-subwarp = 2 and 4, while FSS+RTS outperforms rest of the defense
mechanisms for num-subwarp = 8 and 16. For num-subwarp = 2 and 4, the RSS+RTS
introduces randomness in the coalescing at subwarp sizing as well as at thread to subwarp
allocation level. Therefore, the correlation values decreases more in RSS+RTS than in
FSS+RTS. However, for num-subwarp = 8 and 16, the variance in the last round coa-
lesced accesses is lower in the case of FSS+RTS compared to RSS+RTS. It is because
FSS+RTS has more subwarps with the same size compared to RSS+RTS. These findings
are corroborated by the theoretical analysis (Table 3.2).
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3.6.2 Effect on Performance and Data Movement
Figure 3.16 shows the execution time and the total number of memory accesses with respect
to num-subwarp for each defense mechanism. In Figure 3.16a, we notice an increase in
the total memory accesses with respect to num-subwarp. This increase in the memory
accesses is attributed to the subwarp based defense mechanisms – FSS and RSS – which
reduce the possibility of memory accesses coalescing by dividing the threads of a warp
into different subwarps. Therefore, we observe an increase in the execution time as the
num-subwarp increases (Figure 3.16b). We make two more observations. First, the RTS
mechanism does not affect the performance. Although the order of the thread allocation
to the subwarps dictates the number of coalesced accesses in a subwarp and hence across
the entire warp, the overall effect on performance averages itself out over a large number
of plaintexts.
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Figure 3.16: Performance and Data Movement Comparisons between FSS, FSS+RTS,
RSS, and RSS+RTS. c© 2018 IEEE.
Second, the RSS-based mechanisms (RSS and RSS+RTS) show a slightly lower increase
in the memory accesses compared to the FSS-based mechanisms (FSS and FSS+RTS).
This is because the skewed distribution of subwarp sizes in the RSS-based mechanisms
(Section 3.4.2) increases the possibility of a few subwarps to be larger than others. There-
fore, on average, the RSS and RSS+RTS defense mechanisms perform better than the
FSS and FSS+RTS defense mechanisms.
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3.6.3 Evaluating the Trade-off Between Security and Performance
We define the RCoal Score metric, as per Equation 3.7, to allow hardware engineers to





In the above equation, S is the square of the inverse of the average correlation values
calculated from the attack as shown in Figure 3.15. The parameters (a and b) can be set by
the hardware engineer to put an appropriate emphasis on either security or performance.
For example, Figure 3.17a shows the RCoal Score values for a security-oriented system
with a = 1 and b = 1. We note that FSS+RTS with num-subwarp = 8 and 16 is best
suited for improving GPU security, albeit with a considerable loss in the performance. For
a performance-oriented system, we set a = 1 and b = 20, as shown in Figure 3.17b. In
this case, for num-subwarp = 8 and 16, RSS+RTS scores higher than FSS+RTS since it
offers an improvement in the performance at a moderate loss in security.
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Figure 3.17: Comparison between the FSS, FSS+RTS, RSS and RSS+RTS defense
mechanisms based on the RCoal score against the corresponding attacks: a) Security-
oriented system with a = 1 and b = 1, b) Performance-oriented system with a = 1 and
b = 20. c© 2018 IEEE.
3.6.4 Case Study: Plaintext with 1024 Lines
We evaluate the scalability of the subwarp based defense mechanisms by increasing the
plaintext size to 1024 lines. To negate the ill-effects of the warp scheduling noise during
the security evaluation of the defense mechanisms, we correlate the last round coalesced
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accesses calculated from the corresponding attacks with the last round coalesced accesses
observed during the encryption. It is evident that if the attacker is able to correctly
estimate the last round coalesced accesses during the attack, then the correlation will be
highest for the correct guess of the key byte leading to a successful recovery of the key. We
discuss the security and the performance of each mechanism with respect to num-subwarp.
Security. Figure 3.18a shows the average correlation for all key bytes of the last round
key for each defense mechanism. As expected, we notice that the average correlation
decreases for FSS+RTS, RSS and RSS+RTS mechanisms for num-subwarp greater than
1. We conclude that our defense mechanisms improve security on GPUs encrypting large
plaintexts as well.
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Figure 3.18: Effects of the defense mechanisms on security against the corresponding
attacks and performance with respect to the number of subwarps for plaintext with 1024
lines: a) Average of correlations between the last round coalesced accesses from the attack
and the execution for all key bytes, b) Execution time (normalized to the case when
num-subwarp=1) with respect to the number of subwarps. c© 2018 IEEE.
Performance. Figure 3.18b shows the execution time for each mechanism normalized to
the baseline case of num-subwarp set to 1. As in the case of plaintext with 32 lines, we note
that the RTS mechanism does not affect the execution time. Also, the the execution time
increases with num-subwarp. Additionally, as earlier, RSS-based mechanisms increase the
coalescing possibilities and deliver better performance than the FSS-based mechanisms.
In conclusion, we observe that RSS+RTS mechanism offers an improved security with
performance degradation in the range of 29 to 76% for num-subwarp = 2, 4, and 8. This
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indicates that the defense mechanisms presented in this work scale well with the plaintext
size.
3.7 Discussion and Future Work
In the context of RCoal, we discuss the following two future research directions.
• The current implementation of RCoal spans over the entire execution of the AES
and assumes that all rounds are equally vulnerable [101]. The advantage of such an
implementation is that it does not require software support to identify the vulnerable
portions (rounds) of the code. To enhance the performance further, RCoal can be limited
only to the vulnerable part of the code. However, that would require software support to
correctly identify the vulnerable portions of the code and hardware support to frequently
turn coalescing on and off based on which warps are executing the vulnerable code at a
given time. We leave the development of such hardware/software support as a part of the
future work.
• We presented a series of defense mechanisms that focused only on the intra-warp
coalescing techniques. Therefore, we disabled other bandwidth conserving optimizations in
GPUs (e.g., MSHRs and caches). However, we believe our proposed intra-warp coalescing
will be more effective if randomization is employed at all levels of the memory hierarchy.
We leave the development of these randomization techniques as a part of the future work.
3.8 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that proposes randomized coalescing
mechanisms to thwart timing attacks in GPUs. In this section, we list works relevant to
ours.
Timing attacks. Cryptographic algorithms implemented on CPUs have been the major
targets of timing attacks. Those attacks exploit the fact that key-dependent memory
accesses, such as table-lookups in AES, affect the memory access patterns and hence, the
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status of data cache. Hence, an attacker may infer private keys by observing the execution
time of either a cryptographic algorithm (e.g., [102, 9, 8, 30]), or his own application if
the data cache is shared (e.g., [30, 142, 40, 145]).
Pietro et al. [107] identified that the memory leaks are possible at various levels of GPU
memory hierarchy, especially at software-managed scratchpad memory and register file. A
recent work [45] exploits a new fine-grained timing channel caused by bank conflicts in a
GPU’s shared memory. A complete AES key recovery timing attack was first demonstrated
on a commercial GPU architecture by Jiang et al. [44]. We have already extensively
discussed this attack and proposed defense mechanisms that trade-off performance for
security.
Timing channel mitigation. Several hardware-based timing attacks have been pro-
posed in the context of CPUs [102, 67, 144, 132, 133, 70, 136]. Among those works, more
related are mechanisms based on randomization [132, 133, 70, 136]. Most of these works
randomize the memory-to-cache mapping or the cache replacement policy, while our work
proposes to randomize the coalescing behavior.
Coalescing and Bandwidth Saving Techniques in GPUs. Kloosterman et al. [55]
proposed warp-pool, an enhanced inter-warp sharing mechanism to reduce global memory
accesses. Rhu et al. [112] proposed cache sectoring mechanism to reduce unnecessary data
fetches from global memory. A series of warp scheduling techniques [47, 51, 114, 113] have
been proposed to reduce cache misses and improve memory bandwidth utilization. None
of these works focused on hardware security issues, as we do in this paper.
3.9 Conclusions
Our findings confirm that the deterministic nature of the coalescing logic is a major cause
of security vulnerability in GPUs. To address this vulnerability, we propose a series of
defense mechanisms that allow the coalescing logic to randomly change the number of
coalesced accesses. Specifically, we propose to randomize: a) the granularity at which
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intra-warp coalescing is performed in the baseline architecture, and b) allocation of the
thread elements per subwarp. Our theoretical and empirical results show that our random-




Coalescing for Efficient and Secure
GPUs
4.1 Introduction
Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) provide orders of magnitude higher throughput com-
pared to CPUs thanks to a large number of computational units attached with high band-
width memory. GPUs have traditionally accelerated a wide-range of arguably security
insensitive applications ranging from gaming to high-performance computing. However,
many applications that benefit from GPUs nowadays process or contain security/privacy-
sensitive information. For example, DNA and financial computing applications that heav-
ily process private data are taking advantage of GPUs [94, 92]. The deep learning com-
munity has significantly benefited from the computational power of GPUs but now is
also concerned about the privacy of their models and vendors; they are interested in pro-
tecting them from motivated attackers [37, 81]. Cryptographic and other computations
that handle sensitive data are also known to achieve significant performance benefits from
GPUs [49, 44, 128, 72, 17, 83, 42].
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With the growing need for secure GPU computation, it is important to protect GPUs
from a variety of possible side-channel attacks. For example, several attacks (especially,
cache-based side-channel attacks [131, 132, 133, 70, 71, 111, 141]) on the CPU side have
exploited the fact that critical information can be leaked if it affects the latency (or total
execution time). In the same vein, new correlation timing attacks and covert channels [44,
80, 135, 45] are being exposed in GPUs – a recent attack [44] showed that AES private keys
can be recovered by exploiting the correlation between the number of coalesced accesses
and execution time. Specifically, an attacker exploits the relationship between the private
keys and the number of coalesced accesses to reveal the entire private key by performing
off-line correlation analysis with the help of recorded execution time and encrypted (cipher)
text information.1
Kadam et al. [49] presented the first work to address the aforementioned correlation
timing attack. They showed that by randomizing the logic of coalescing unit (RCoal),
additional accesses can be generated such that the correlation between the baseline (real)
accesses and the execution time is reduced. Consequently, the attacker finds it hard to
recover the private keys. However, we find that RCoal has two major drawbacks. First,
the performance loss for security gain is very high due to the randomization of coalescing
logic, especially for large plain texts. Second, RCoal provides sub-optimal security in the
presence of other memory bandwidth conserving mechanisms such as miss-status holding
registers (MSHRs) and caches. As we further demonstrate in Section 4.3, the additional
duplicate accesses generated during randomization are merged back in MSHRs to render
RCoal ineffective. Therefore, RCoal turned-off caches and MSHRs for security reasons,
leading to even more significant performance overheads.
To efficiently address the limitations of RCoal, we propose a new bucketing-based
coalescing technique – BCoal. It always generates the number of coalesced accesses equal
to one of the pre-determined values (known as buckets), irrespective of program secrets.
This implies BCoal would generate additional memory accesses (if necessary) along with
1More details on the attack are provided in Section 4.2.
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the real accesses to match the bucket requirements. As the number of accesses is always
equal to the pre-determined values, the variance in the number of accesses drops. As a
result, BCoal reduces the correlation to mitigate the timing attack.
To reduce the performance overhead of additional accesses, we select optimal bucket
features by analyzing the application-level coalescing profile. The goal of profiling is
to select the bucket features such that overall fewer additional accesses are generated.
Further, we observe that the generation of additional accesses is non-trivial because we
need to ensure that they affect the execution time at the same rate as the real accesses,
otherwise their effect on the execution time can be filtered out (i.e., noise can be filtered
out from signal). To address this issue, we generate unique additional accesses to the
same memory space as that of the real accesses. We find that this helps in reducing the
disparity between caching/merging probabilities of real accesses and additional accesses,
thereby making their individual effects on execution time also similar. Consequently, our
bucketing-based coalescing technique provides security even in the presence of MSHRs
and caches.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that proposes a bucketing-based
coalescing technique for GPUs to achieve better security compared to the state-of-the-
art scheme while incurring low overhead. In summary, this paper makes the following
contributions:
• We perform a detailed analysis to show that the state-of-the-art defense schemes
against the coalescing-based correlation timing attack are inefficient. They incur a signif-
icant performance and data movement overhead as they work only when the bandwidth
conserving hardware such as caches and MSHRs are not employed.
•We propose a new bucketing-based coalescing mechanism (BCoal) that always issues
pre-determined numbers (chosen from a small set, called buckets) of coalesced accesses by
padding additional accesses to the real accesses, if necessary.
• Our analysis shows that the generation of padded accesses is non-trivial and the
effect of MSHRs and caches should be considered to ensure security. BCoal implements a
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homogeneous padding mechanism to ensure that the real and padded accesses affect the
execution time similarly even in the presence of MSHRs and caches. Therefore, an attacker
fails to separate the timing effect of padded accesses thereby improving the security.
• Our theoretical and experimental analysis shows that BCoal significantly improves
the security (i.e., drops the correlation by up to 100%) at a modest performance overhead
ranging from 5% to 15%. We also evaluate BCoal across a large set of GPGPU appli-
cations and show that coalescing with three equally-spaced buckets provides an excellent
performance-security trade-off that can be leveraged to secure the GPUs.
4.2 Background
This section briefly introduces: a) the baseline GPU architecture, b) bandwidth conserving
mechanisms, c) the AES encryption on GPU, and d) the baseline correlation timing attack
and the state-of-the-art defense mechanism against it.
4.2.1 Basics of GPU Architecture
We consider a baseline GPU architecture with multiple cores, known as streaming multi-
processors (SMs) in NVIDIA terminology. The SMs are connected to memory partitions
via an interconnect as shown in Figure 4.1. GPUs achieve high throughput by execut-
ing a large number of threads concurrently. To facilitate this, GPUs are supported by a
large register file (for fast context switching across threads) and high bandwidth mem-
ories (for fast data access to a large number of concurrent threads). Each SM executes
the threads assigned to it at the granularity of a warp, which is essentially a collection
of (usually 32) individual threads that execute a single instruction on the processing ele-
ments (PEs) of the SM in a lock-step. The warps hide long memory latencies to improve
the utilization/throughput of the SM via executing in a pipelined and multiplexed man-
ner. Throughout the paper, we evaluate the proposed techniques on a cycle-level GPU
simulator – GPGPU-Sim [6]. Table 4.1 provides details of the simulated architecture.



















Figure 4.1: Overview of Baseline GPU Architecture. c© 2020 IEEE.
Table 4.1: Key configuration parameters of the simulated GPU. c© 2020 IEEE.
Core Features 1400MHz core clock, SIMT width = 32 (16 × 2)
Resources / Core 32KB shared memory, 32KB register file, 15 SMs
L1 Caches / Core 16KB 4-way L1 data cache, 2KB 4-way I-cache
128B cache block size
L2 Caches 16-way 256 KB/memory channel (1536 KB in total),
128B cache block size
Features Inter-warp merging enabled
Memory Model 6 GDDR5 Memory Controllers, FR-FCFS scheduling
16 DRAM-banks, 924 MHz memory clock
Interconnect 1400MHz interconnect clock
4.2.2 Bandwidth Conserving Mechanisms
Memory bandwidth is one of the most performance-critical shared resources in GPUs [47,
46]. GPUs adopt several memory bandwidth optimization techniques, such as memory
access coalescing, caching and merging to reduce the number of accesses to the global
memory. In this sub-section, we provide a brief overview of these optimizations.
Access Coalescing. In GPUs, threads within a warp execute the instructions in lock-
step. For a global memory load instruction, all 32 threads within a warp execute 32 load
instructions. The coalescing unit in the LD/ST unit merges multiple memory requests
from different threads of the same warp (intra-warp coalescing) into as few cache line-
sized coalesced memory accesses as possible. The intra-warp coalescing happens at the
sub-warp granularity, where the coalescing unit of the SM determines the coalesced ac-
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cesses of the warp by examining a group of threads belonging to the same sub-warp. If the
threads of a sub-warp access data within a contiguous memory block, their requests are
coalesced together to reduce memory bandwidth consumption. The size and number of
sub-warps are typically fixed and remain the same throughout the application execution.
However, to achieve security, the coalescing mechanisms can be randomized (RCoal [49])
so that the coalesced accesses are no longer predictable to the attacker.
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(a) Baseline memory coalescing.
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(b) Randomized memory coalescing.
Figure 4.2: Memory access coalescing in GPUs. c© 2020 IEEE.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the coalescing in baseline GPU and previously proposed ran-
domized coalescing techniques. Assume a single warp with four threads. The per-thread
addresses and the requested block addresses (BA) are shown with corresponding thread-
ids (tid) and sub-warp id (sid). In the baseline GPU, we assume a single sub-warp (sid =
0 for all threads) and hence all threads participate together in the coalescing. Since the
requests from tid 1 and 2 map to the same cache block, only three accesses are generated
( A ) to conserve the memory bandwidth. With randomized coalescing, the threads are
randomly assigned to subwarps and hence lead to unpredictable effects on coalescing. In
Figure 4.2(b), we observe that four accesses are generated ( B ) due to different sub-warp
ids assigned to the random groups of thread. More details on the randomized coalescing
techniques are discussed in Section 4.2.4.
Caching. GPUs further conserve the memory bandwidth by exploiting the temporal
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and spatial locality in memory accesses across and within warps with the help of hard-
ware caches. Current GPUs employ two levels of caches, L1-cache (shared by the warps
executing on the same SM) and L2-cache (shared by the warps executing on different
SMs).
Access Merging. The coalesced memory accesses from a warp are sent to the L1-
cache. Upon cache misses, the memory accesses are logged in the miss-status holding
registers (MSHRs). Multiple cache-missed coalesced accesses to the same cache block
from different warps on the same SM are merged (inter-warp merging) in MSHRs. Note
that as independent loads from the same warp can be issued to improve memory-level
parallelism, MSHRs also help in merging redundant accesses from the same warp (intra-
warp merging) if they are issued at different times. Another source of inter-warp merging
is via MSHRs at L2-cache, where the redundant L2-cache misses (across different SMs)
can be merged together.
4.2.3 AES Encryption
To demonstrate the GPU timing attack exploiting the vulnerability due to memory co-
alescing, we consider the widely used symmetric-key algorithm, Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [78, 34, 41, 89, 66] with a key length of 128 bits, to encrypt the plaintext.
AES-128 algorithm consists of 10 rounds, each with a 16-bytes round key generated from
the encryption key. We focus on the last round of the AES, which is shown to be the most
vulnerable to side-channel attacks [44]. The last round involves a table (for the S-box
table T4) look-up operation followed by bitwise XOR operation with the last round key.
Our AES implementation on GPU is from Jiang et al. [44, 42], which was used in the
original attack [44] and a known defense [49]. We used the same implementation for a
fair comparison. The AES implementation on GPU involves dividing the plaintext across
multiple parallel threads to achieve high throughput. Each thread encrypts a line of the
plaintext independent of other threads. Therefore, a warp consisting of 32 threads can
perform 32 different encryptions concurrently. In general, the line to thread mapping
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is sequential and deterministic. If the size of the plaintext exceeds 32 lines, then it is
divided sequentially among several warps. For example, a plaintext with 1024 lines will
employ 32 warps each executing 32 lines of the plaintext. To ensure a stronger baseline
for comparison, the AES implementation used in this paper performs random mapping of
threads to the warps (known as input blinding) to gain additional security [49].
4.2.4 Baseline Attack and Defense Mechanism
Baseline Attack. In this work, we use the same attack model as designed by Jiang et
al.[44]. It assumes that the attacker can send a large number of plaintexts to a remote
GPU-based AES [78, 34, 41, 89, 66] encryption server and collect the ciphertext. The
attacker also records the total execution time required to complete each encryption. The
attack was also shown to be very effective in noisy environments[44].
Given that the GPU coalescing procedure is deterministic [61] and the last round of
AES is invertible [44], the attacker can calculate the number of coalesced accesses with
the help of ciphertext and a last round key guess. As the number of coalesced accesses is
correlated with the execution time in the baseline system [44], the key guess that leads to
the best correlation across a large number of encryptions is determined to be the correct
key. This attack further assumes that the round tables are kept in GPU DRAM, which
can be cached in L1/L2 caches based on the access patterns. For brevity, we skip the
algorithmic details of the attack and refer readers to prior works [49, 44]. Also, the
rest of the paper assumes a stronger attacker with the capability of accessing last round
execution time as compared to the realistic attack, which is weaker due to the noise in
the total execution time. Consequently, we assume the goal of the attacker is to correctly
guess the last round AES encryption key [49], which can divulge all other round keys by
reverting the fixed AES key generation schedule.
Figure 4.3 shows the scatter plots for the baseline correlation attack for the single-warp
(plaintext with 32 lines) and multi-warp (plaintext with 64 lines) cases. Each scatter plot
shows the correlation values for all 256 possible values for the 3rd key byte of the last
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(a) Plaintext with 32 lines.
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(b) Plaintext with 64 lines.
Figure 4.3: Baseline Attack. c© 2020 IEEE.
round. Each point on the scatter plot corresponds to a correlation value between the
number of coalesced accesses (on a per-warp basis) calculated by the attacker and the
execution time of the last round of AES-128. In the multi-warp case, the maximum value
of the number of coalesced accesses across all warps is used as the warp that generates the
most number of coalesced accesses has shown to dominate the total execution time [44].
From Figure 4.3, we observe that the correlation value is the highest (highlighted in red
and encircled) for the correct value of the 3rd key byte among all other guess values for
the single- as well as the multi-warp case. Therefore, the correct value of the key byte
3 is recoverable. We observe this trend for all last round key bytes indicating successful
recovery.
Baseline Defense. Kadam et al. [49] presented a series of randomized coalescing (RCoal)
mechanisms to defend against the correlation timing attacks. They showed that randomiz-
ing the number of subwarps, the sizes of subwarps, and the thread elements of the subwarp
can improve the GPU security, however at the cost of performance loss and increased data
movement between SMs and memory. Based on these three parameters, three RCoal
mechanisms were proposed: fixed-sized subwarp (FSS), random-sized subwarp (RSS), and
random-threaded subwarp (RTS). They showed that the best performance-security trade-
off can be achieved with an RCoal mechanism (RSS+RTS+4), which uses the number
of subwarps to be 4, the sizes of warps are chosen based on a skewed distribution, and
the thread elements are chosen randomly based on a uniform distribution. In rest of the
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(a) RCoal(4) with Plaintext (32 lines).
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(b) RCoal(32) with Plaintext (32 lines).
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(c) RCoal(4) with Plaintext (64 lines).
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(d) RCoal(32) with Plaintext (64 lines).
Figure 4.4: Effect of different RCoal coalescing schemes on the recovery of one of the
last round key byte (shown in red circle). In RCoal, the caches and MSHRs are disabled
for security reasons (refer Section 4.3-B). c© 2020 IEEE.
paper, we denote this best of the RCoal scheme as RCoal(4). Note that if the number of
subwarps is equal to the number of threads in a warp then it is equivalent to coalescing
being disabled as all threads independently participate in the coalescing procedure. For
example, with a warp size of 32, choosing the number of subwarps to be 32 is equivalent
to disabling the coalescing. We denote this as RCoal(32). RCoal(32) was shown to be the
most secure design as the number of coalesced access is always constant at 32 [49]. Due
to security concerns, RCoal disabled caches and MSHRs (refer to Section 4.3.2 for more
details).
Figure 4.4 shows the scatter plots for RCoal(32) (the most secure mechanism) and
RCoal(4) (best of RCoal) using plaintext with 32 and 64 lines. In contrast to the baseline
attack, for RCoal(32) and RCoal(4), the correlation between the number of coalesced ac-
cesses and execution time with the correct key (highlighted in red and encircled) dropped
significantly. Consequently, this point is no more distinguishable among the other corre-
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lation points ensuring successful defense against the attack. We observe this trend for all
last round key bytes.
4.3 Motivation and Analysis
Although RCoal helps in improving the GPU security significantly, it also incurs a very
high performance and data movement overhead. To substantiate the overhead of RCoal,
Figure 4.5 shows the total execution time and number of DRAM accesses for two scenarios:
a) RCoal(32) – the most secure design, and b) RCoal(4) – the best of RCoal. These results
are shown for three different sizes of plaintexts (32, 64, and 1024) and are normalized
to the baseline GPU. We observe that the overhead of RCoal(32) is very high – more
than 27× increase in the number of DRAM accesses leading to over 9.4× increase in the
execution time. Furthermore, the performance degradation increases rapidly with the size
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Figure 4.5: Illustrating the overhead of RCoal defense scheme for different sizes of plain-
text. The results are normalized to a baseline GPU with MSHRs and caches. c© 2020
IEEE.
4.3.1 Performance Overhead Analysis of RCoal
There are two major reasons behind the large performance and data movement overhead.
First, RCoal introduces sub-optimal and randomized coalescing that causes additional
memory traffic. To understand this, we analyze the number of coalesced accesses generated
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Figure 4.6: Histogram of the number of coalesced accesses generated across a warp for
1000 plaintext samples each with 32 lines. c© 2020 IEEE.
in three different architecture options: baseline, RCoal(4), and RCoal(32). For these
three options, Figure 4.6 shows the number of coalesced accesses with respect to the
percentage of load instructions in the AES CUDA implementation. We observe a bimodal
distribution in the baseline scenario (Figure 4.6(a)): the first peak occurs when only
one coalesced cache line access is generated for roughly 20% instructions and the second
peak occur between 12-16 coalesced cache line accesses for the remaining instructions.
The first peak is observed due to the loads for the round keys and the second peak is
due to the table lookup operations. With RCoal(32) (Figure 4.6(c)), the coalescing unit
performs worst to always generate 32 coalesced accesses for all load instructions. As
noted before, this is similar to the coalescing being disabled. Although it is the most
secure option, the average number of coalesced accesses and the overall number of DRAM
accesses increase significantly (Figure 4.5). In RCoal(4) (Figure 4.6(b)), we observe that
the second peak has shifted to the right compared to Figure 4.5(a) due the obfuscation of
the coalescing mechanism that generates additional memory traffic. Overall, RCoal(4) and
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RCoal (32) generate additional memory traffic and incur performance penalties to reduce
the correlation between the number of baseline coalesced accesses and the execution time.
Importantly, RCoal ignores the application properties, especially the baseline coalescing
profile to optimally generate the traffic while reducing the correlation.
Second, due to the security reasons, RCoal schemes were only shown to work in the
absence of other bandwidth optimization techniques, such as caches and MSHRs. The
absence of MSHRs and caches has a substantial impact on the performance and data
movement, and is well-documented in GPU literature [6, 47, 117]. The combined effect
of sub-optimal coalescing, and absence of MSHRs and caches leads to a sharp increase in
the number of DRAM accesses resulting in high performance degradation.
4.3.2 Effect of MSHRs and Caches on Security with RCoal
Effect of MSHRs. In the presence of MSHRs, RCoal scheme becomes vulnerable to
the correlation timing attacks. RCoal randomizes the access coalescing and generates
redundant accesses to the same block addresses to reduce the correlation between the
execution time and the number of baseline coalesced accesses. The MSHRs render RCoal
scheme ineffective by merging the redundant accesses to the same block addresses leading
to similar correlation as in the case of baseline GPU. The effect of MSHRs on RCoal
scheme is prominent for the table lookup instructions experiencing a high cache-miss rate
as the corresponding accesses are likely served through MSHRs leading to predictable
access merging. This is especially true for the initial table lookup instructions of the last
round because T4 table elements are less likely cached. Figure 4.7 shows this merging-
back phenomenon using the example from Figure 4.2. RCoal(4) generated 4 accesses A ,
including one redundant access. However, MSHRs merged back the cache-missed accesses,
leading to the same number of accesses ( B ) generated to the DRAM as that of in the
baseline case. Consequently, it leads to the same correlation and information leakage as
that of the baseline GPU.
Effect of caches. The security of RCoal depends on the cache hit rates. For example,
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Figure 4.7: Effect of MSHRs on the cache-missed coalesced accesses in RCoal scheme.
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(b) RCoal(4) + MSHRs + Caches.
Figure 4.8: The presence of MSHRs and caches leads to successful recovery of one of the
last round key bytes in RCoal(32) and RCoal(4). Plaintext has 32 lines. c© 2020 IEEE.
in the case of RCoal(32), if all accesses of a table lookup instruction are always cached,
then all 32 accesses from the coalescing unit are served by the cache. Therefore, if the
execution time remains constant due to the constant number of accesses to the cache,
the attacker cannot establish the correlation between the number of baseline coalesced
accesses and the execution time to reveal the private key. However, a perfect cache hit
rate cannot be guaranteed for all the table lookup instructions across a large number of
plaintext samples. Therefore, if the accesses of a table lookup instruction miss in the
cache, the key byte can still be recovered with RCoal due to the access merging in MSHR
as discussed earlier. To illustrate this point, Figure 4.8 shows the scatter plots for the
first table lookup instruction of the last round with MSHRs and caches enabled. We note
that the private key byte 3 corresponding to the first table lookup instruction can easily
be recovered in both the RCoal scenarios.
In summary, RCoal becomes vulnerable due to the access optimizations in MSHRs and
caches.
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4.3.3 Our Proposal and Goals
Our goal is to design a mechanism that reduces the performance overheads of RCoal
while offering comparable security. To this end, we propose BCoal: a bucketing-based
coalescing mechanism to address the primary performance-related shortcomings of RCoal
discussed before. BCoal matches the number of coalesced accesses generated for a global
memory load instruction per warp to one of the predetermined values (denoted as buck-
ets). To match the number of accesses to one of the preset bucket sizes, we pad the
real coalesced accesses from a warp with additional (padded) memory accesses. Since the
total numbers of accesses always match one of the bucket sizes, their overall variance de-
creases. Furthermore, as observed earlier for RCoal, MSHRs adversely affect the security
by merging the redundant accesses after randomized coalescing. Therefore, the padding
mechanism in BCoal is devised such that MSHRs cannot merge the real and padded
accesses, thereby maintaining a very low variance in the resulting number of accesses.
Additionally, the padding mechanism ensures that the real and padded accesses follow
similar access merging and caching pattern, such that they affect the execution time at
the same rate. Subsequently, the individual effects of real and padded accesses on the
execution time are indistinguishable. Therefore, in BCoal-enabled GPU, the attacker will
not be able to correlate the number of real coalesced accesses with the observed execution
time. Consequently, the security offered by BCoal scheme against the correlation timing
attacks remains intact even in the presence of MSHRs and caches. In summary, BCoal
scheme presented in this work not only offers improved security but also incurs minimal
performance degradation as compared to RCoal.
4.4 Anatomy of Bucketing in GPUs
In this section, we first explain our general approach towards realizing a bucketing scheme
and then explore the design challenges in meeting the bucketing requirements in the pres-
ence of MSHRs and caches. Finally, based on our analysis, we present our secure bucketing
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scheme – BCoal.
4.4.1 Bucket Features
Let us assume a system with n buckets and sizes of buckets to be: b1,..,bi, bi+1,...,bn where
∀i : bi < bi+1. A predetermined number of coalesced accesses are generated per table
lookup (load) instruction as per the bucket size. If a load instruction generates n number
of coalesced accesses, where bi < n ≤ bi+1, then additional accesses are padded such that
the total number of coalesced accesses is equal to bi+1. The number of buckets is selected
to achieve the desired reduction in the variance of the number of coalesced accesses. For
example, with only one bucket, the number of accesses generated is always equal to the size
of that bucket, thus, reducing the variance to zero. As the number of buckets increases,
the variance in the number of coalesced accesses increases due to the increased number
of distinct possible values for the coalesced accesses. This leads to higher information
leakage, however, also reduces the total number of additional padded accesses.
We revisit Figure 4.6(a) to select the bucket features for AES. We observe that the
number of coalesced accesses during the AES encryption on GPU never exceeds 16. There-
fore, we select the size of the bucket to be 16 as one of the options and denote the scheme
as BCoal(16). With only one bucket of size 16 in the coalescing unit, the AES encryp-
tion will always generate 16 number of coalesced accesses to reduce their variance to 0.
Consequently, the correlation between the number of real coalesced accesses and the ex-
ecution time drops as well. However, with only one bucket, each (security-sensitive and
security-insensitive) load instruction sends 16 accesses, leading to performance degrada-
tion (Section 4.6).
The performance of BCoal scheme can be further improved by adding multiple buckets
of intermediate sizes. We propose to add one more bucket with size 1 because of the bi-
modal distribution observed in Figure 4.6(a) and call this scheme BCoal(1, 16). The
performance degradation in BCoal(1, 16) will be lower than in BCoal(16) because the
coalesced accesses generated by instructions other than the table lookups (the first peak
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in Figure 4.6(a)) now fit into the added bucket. Furthermore, in BCoal(1, 16), as the
bucket with size 1 does not affect the table lookup instructions, its effect on the security
is minimum. We quantify all performance and security results in Section 4.6.
4.4.2 Estimation of Number of Padded Accesses
To generate an optimal number of padded memory accesses for bucketing, we first need
to determine the number of real memory accesses generated for a load instruction of a
warp. The number of real coalesced accesses generated by the load instruction is stored
as the pending request count (PRC) in the coalescing unit [61]. By reading PRC, we
determine the number of real memory accesses. Next, we compare the number of real
memory accesses generated with the preset bucket values. If the number of real memory
accesses does not match, then we generate a number of padded memory accesses equal
to the difference between the next larger bucket value and the number of real memory
accesses. For example, in BCoal(1,16), if the number of original memory accesses is 12,
then we need to generate 4 extra memory accesses.
4.4.3 Design Challenges in Generating Padded Accesses
We consider the effect of MSHRs and caches on RCoal scheme while designing the padding
mechanism for BCoal. In RCoal, the redundant accesses to the same block addresses were
merged in MSHRs eliminating the security offered by randomized coalescing of accesses.
Therefore, to meet the bucketing requirement, we must generate padded accesses to the
unique block addresses. Consequently, all memory accesses originating from a warp, real
and padded, have unique block addresses. The unique accesses for padding are generated
randomly from an address range that is accessible to the AES CUDA application. In our
case, the block address range spans over the five tables used for table lookups and the
round keys used for each round, all saved in the DRAM.
To evaluate the resulting bucketing scheme, we first determine the possibility of key
byte recovery in the absence of MSHRs and caches. Figure 4.9a shows the scatter plots for
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the bucketing scheme employing padding via unique accesses in the absence of MSHRs and
caches. We note that the correct value of the key byte cannot be recovered as the attacker
fails to establish a correlation between the real number of accesses and the execution time.
The low correlation is attributed to the constant number of accesses generated per table
lookup instruction across the plaintext samples leading to the low variance in them.
From the above padding mechanisms employed in the bucketing scheme, we make the
following observation:
Observation I: For the secure bucketing scheme, the block addresses of the padded
accesses should be random and unique (that is, exclusive of the block addresses of the real
and other padded accesses of the corresponding table lookup instruction).
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Figure 4.9: Evaluation of security offered by the bucketing scheme employing unique
access padding mechanisms with one bucket of size 16. Plaintext has 32 lines. c© 2020
IEEE.
Effect of MSHRs and caches. We evaluate the effect of MSHRs and caches on the
security of above bucketing mechanism using the scatter plot in Figure 4.9b. We note that
while the correlation and related key byte value leakage is low, the correct value of the key
byte can still be recovered. The key byte value leakage is possible because the real and
padded accesses affect the execution time at different rates due to their distinct merging
and caching patterns.
The distinct access merging and caching patterns are caused because of the different
block address ranges accessed by the real and padded accesses. In the above bucketing
scheme, the padded accesses generated in each round access the same range of block ad-
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dresses spread across the entire memory space of the AES CUDA application. In contrast
to the padded accesses, in the last round, the real accesses target only the T4 table el-
ements. As the real accesses are confined to a narrower address space (only T4 table
elements) as compared to the padded accesses (entire application memory space), their
respective merging and caching patterns are different. Therefore, the padded and real
accesses affect the execution time at different rates. An attacker can then treat the effect
of padded accesses on the execution time as noise and filter it out over a large number
of plaintext samples to correlate the real accesses and the execution time to recover the
private key. The effect of MSHRs and caches on the real and padded accesses leads to the
following observation:
Observation II: The padded and real accesses should be homogeneous in terms of their
respective probabilities of merging in MSHRs and caching.
4.4.4 BCoal: A Secure Bucketing Scheme
From the observations I and II recorded previously, we note that for a secure bucketing
scheme to operate in the presence of MSHRs and caches, the padded accesses should have
the following two characteristics: i) the block addresses of the padded accesses should be
random and exclusive (unique) of the block addresses of the other accesses and ii) the
padded accesses should follow the same merging and caching pattern as that of the real
accesses.
Padding via Homogeneous Unique Accesses. The first property of the desired
padding mechanism is met by ensuring that the block addresses of the padded accesses
are random and unique across each security-sensitive load instruction. To enforce the
second property, we recall the merging mechanism in MSHRs, where the accesses going to
the same block addresses are merged together. Furthermore, the caching also works at the
block address granularity. Therefore, to obtain similar merging and caching probabilities
across all accesses, we restrict the block addresses of the padded accesses to the range
of possible block addresses of the real accesses, thereby generating homogeneous unique
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accesses.2
During the AES execution, the table lookup instructions of the first nine rounds access
first four tables, while for the last round only T4 table is accessed. Therefore, to meet the
bucketing requirements, the padding mechanism should restrict the block address range
of the padded accesses to the block address range of the first four tables in DRAM during
the first nine rounds, while to the block address range of T4 table in DRAM during the last
round. As the padding mechanism maintains similar merging and caching properties for
the real and the padded accesses, the attacker cannot segregate their effects on the total
execution time. Therefore, the attacker will fail to establish the correlation between the
real number of coalesced accesses and the execution time, thereby failing to recover the
key byte value. Furthermore, as all rounds of AES encryption are potentially vulnerable
to timing attacks [100], BCoal is enabled for all ten rounds of AES.
In summary, we select the padding via homogeneous unique accesses for the BCoal
bucketing scheme. We present the security and performance evaluation of the proposed
BCoal scheme with MSHRs and caches enabled in Section 4.6.
4.5 Hardware/Software Overhead
In this section, we describe the implementation overhead of BCoal. We consider a gen-
eralized BCoal scheme, which targets a security-sensitive application with an arbitrary
number of program sections. For example, the two program sections in AES are the first
9 rounds and the last round. The generated padded accesses have memory addresses that
target respective program sections.
Storage overhead. The storage requirement is for keeping track of a) bucket sizes and
b) the start/end addresses of the program sections. To store the buckets sizes, BCoal uses
a 32-bit mask that covers all 32 possible number of coalesced accesses across a warp. The
indices of the mask are set as per the BCoal configuration. For example, for BCoal(1,
2This heuristic may have to be tuned for different applications based on their memory access pattern.
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16, 32), only 1st, 16th and 32nd bits are set. Next, BCoal maintains an address table –
accessible by all SMs executing the security-sensitive application – to save the start and
end 32-bit addresses of each program section. For an application with N program sections,
the size of the table will be (2N × 32) bits. For AES with 2 program sections, the size of
the table will be 128 bits and the total storage overhead is 128 + 32 = 160 bits.
Address Generation. The generation of unique homogeneous accesses for padding
follows three steps: a) determine the number of padded accesses needed, b) determine
the unique homogeneous block addresses for the accesses, and c) generate the accesses.
As noted in Section 4.4.2, the pending request count (PRC) in the memory coalescing
unit (MCU) records the number of real accesses across a warp. Therefore, the number of
padded accesses needed can be identified by comparing the size of a bucket with PRC.
Since the maximum value of PRC (limited by the maximum possible number of coalesced
accesses) and the maximum size of a bucket is 32, BCoal needs a 5-bit comparator.
The address range for each program section is known from the memory allocation and
data copy operations executed at the start of a GPGPU application. This information
can also be embedded in the load instructions. To generate padded accesses in the range
of the program section under execution, BCoal uses a 32-bit random address generator.
4.6 Analysis of Security & Performance
In this section, we first analyze the security of our proposed bucketing-based coalescing
mechanism, BCoal, via experimental and theoretical analysis. Subsequently, we discuss the
effects of the proposed mechanism on performance and data movement. We also compare
BCoal with RCoal in terms of security, performance and data movement. Finally, we
generalize our mechanism across a wide range of GPGPU applications.
All the results are collected on a cycle-level GPU simulator – GPGPU-Sim [6]. We
assume the same number of samples as that of in the attack scenario [49] for plaintext with
32 lines. For plaintext with 64 lines, we use 1000 samples, the same number as needed for
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the successful attack, to evaluate the defense mechanism for a fair comparison.
4.6.1 Experimental Analysis of Security
For the security evaluation of BCoal scheme in the presence of MSHRs and caches, we
consider two configurations: i) default with one bucket of size 16 denoted as BCoal(16)
and ii) performance efficient with two buckets of sizes 1 and 16 denoted as BCoal(1, 16).
For each BCoal configuration, we plot a scatter plot as explained in Section 4.2.4.
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Figure 4.10: BCoal defense scheme against correlation attack for plaintext with 32 lines.
c© 2020 IEEE.
Plaintext with 32 lines. Figure 4.10 shows the scatter plots for BCoal scheme using
plaintext with 32 lines with MSHRs and caches enabled. We note that the key byte
recovery is not possible because of the low correlation between the number of accesses
and the execution time. The low correlation can be explained as follows. With BCoal
scheme, three scenarios can occur for a table lookup instruction. First, all accesses –
real and padded – for the instruction are cached. In this case, the instruction always
generates 16 accesses to the cache. Second, no accesses are cached, therefore, generating
16 DRAM accesses to the unique block addresses which MSHRs cannot optimize. In both
scenarios, the number of accesses to the cache or DRAM remains constant leading to
reduced correlation with the execution time. In the third case, a partial set of accesses of
the instruction are either cached or merged in MSHR. Here, since the real and the padded
accesses target the same block address range, their merging and caching probabilities are
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Figure 4.11: BCoal defense scheme against correlation attack for plaintext with 64 lines.
c© 2020 IEEE.
similar. Subsequently, the attacker cannot distinguish between the effects of the padded
and real accesses on the execution time and fails to correlate the number of real coalesced
accesses and the execution time. In conclusion, the attacker fails to recover the key byte
in a BCoal-enabled GPU.
Plaintext with 64 lines. Figure 4.11 shows the scatter plots for BCoal scheme using
plaintext with 64 lines with MSHRs and caches enabled. We note that the key byte
recovery is not possible because of the low correlation between the number of accesses and
the execution time. To understand the low correlation, we refer to the correlation timing
attack described by Jiang et al. in [44] for the multi-warp case, where the attacker treats
each warp individually executing a plaintext with 32 lines and chooses the warp with the
highest number of coalesced accesses to recover the key. Therefore, the observations made
for a single warp case hold true for the multi-warp case as well. Particularly, the attacker
cannot correlate the number of real coalesced accesses and the execution time due to the
low variance in the number of accesses, and the homogeneity between the real and padded
accesses. Therefore, the attacker fails to recover the key byte value in the multi-warp
scenario.
The experimental analysis concludes that BCoal-enabled GPU successfully mitigates
the correlation timing attacks in single-warp and multi-warp scenarios.
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4.6.2 Theoretical Analysis of Security
We present an analytical framework to analyze the security of AES. Before a formal
analysis, we consider one instruction in the last round that accesses 12 unique memory
block addresses before padding. When only one bucket is used (at 16), the 4 padded
memory accesses are drawn from the same memory space as the 12 real requests. Hence,
there is no information leakage. In general, we will shortly prove that when BCoal uses
one bucket at 16, there is no information leakage.
When multiple buckets are used, say at 12 and 16, the attacker can infer if the number
of real block addresses being accessed are up to 12 or between 12 and 16, which leaks
some information. However, as we show next, the leakage in general is minimal, due
to the randomized mapping from plaintext lines to warps. The randomized mapping
obfuscates which plaintext lines share the same warp.
To quantify the leakage of BCoal, we note that threads across different warps are not
synchronized and the longest warp execution time dominates the time measurement [44].
Hence, one of the warps, the dominant warp, will have true timing. Known attacks on
multiple warps [44] analyze each warp and use the longest running (dominant) warp for
correlation analysis to recover the AES private keys. So it is safe to focus on an arbitrary
warp in the rest of the analysis. Moreover, we assume the padded and real accesses are
homogeneous (as described in Section 4.4.2). Hence, their probabilities of merging in
MSHRs and caching are identical.
To make a fair comparison with RCoal, we follow the analytical model and assumptions
of RCoal [49]. Futher, we target an arbitrary last-round key byte k and assume that U
is the number of real accesses for the lookup of last round table, T4, with respect to the
key byte k, from the dominant warp. Following RCoal [49], we estimate the number of
plaintext samples required to successfully recover an AES key byte, S, as
S ∝
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where Û is the number of coalesced accesses when the guessed key byte is identical to k,
µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of a random variable respectively.
We first prove BCoal leaks no information with one bucket.
Lemma 1 When BCoal only uses one bucket at 16, the needed samples to break AES is
infinite.
Proof: With only one bucket, P (Û = 16|U = u) = 1 for any u. Hence, µ(Û) = 16 and
µ(U×Û) =
∑
u P (u)µ(U×Û |U = u) = 16
∑
u u×P (u) = 16µ(U). Hence S = (0)−2 =∞.

When the number of buckets is more than one, the computation is more involved.
To simplify the analysis, we further make a conservative assumption that an attacker
may directly observe the unpadded memory blocks in the following analysis. Therefore,
µ(Û) = µ(U), σ(Û) = σ(U).
In AES, the lookup table relevant to key byte k has 16 unique memory block addresses.
With sufficiently random plaintexts and a warp with 32 threads, each thread accesses one of
16 memory block addresses in a uniform way. Hence, the number of unique block addresses



















represents the ways of partitioning 32
threads into i non-empty subsets; 16!(16−i)! , i-permutations of 16, represents the ways of
forming i non-empty subsets from 16 memory block addresses. From this distribution, we
can compute both µ(U) and σ(U) by their definitions.
To compute µ(U×Û), we note that due to the random mapping from plaintext lines to
warps, U and Û only depend on the frequency of accessing the 16 memory block addresses
among the 64 lines of plaintext, which is defined as follows.
Definition 4 For 16 memory blocks and 64 plaintext lines, the frequency set of all possible
accesses to the block addresses are
F = {(f1, . . . , f16) | f1 + · · ·+ f16 = 64}
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Table 4.2: Security Analysis. S denotes the normalized number of samples required to
successfully recover an AES key byte [49]. c© 2020 IEEE.





where fi ∈ F represents the frequency of accessing the i-th memory block address among
the 64 plaintext lines.
Given F ∈ F , µ(U |F ) =
∑
fi∈F µ(1block i is accessed|fi), where 1block i is accessed is an
indicator random variable that has value 1 if block address i is being accessed in the
dominating warp. Given fi accesses to block address i, the probability that it is accessed
in the dominating warp is (1 − C64−32fi /C
64
fi
), where Cmn denotes the binomial coefficient.
Hence,






Given F ∈ F , U and Û are independently and identically distributed. Hence,
µ(U × Û) =
∑
F∈F










Here, P (F ) is the probability of seeing the frequency vector F . Among all 1664 com-













Putting all pieces together, we use a Python script to compute the correlation and
normalized the sample size needed for a successful attack, similar to the RCoal analy-
sis [49]. The results are summarized in Table 4.2. We note that with 1 bucket, BCoal
rules out leakage entirely. With multiple warps, its security is comparable with RCoal(4),
the best of the RCoal schemes. Note that the results of RCoal in Table 4.2 only applies
when MSHR and caches are disabled. But with homogeneous padded and real accesses,
the results of BCoal also applies even if MSHR and caches are enabled.
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In summary, this theoretical security analysis demonstrates that when MSHR and
caches are disabled, both RCoal and BCoal schemes provide significant security against
the correlation timing attack. However, if the MSHRs and caches are enabled, RCoal
becomes vulnerable due to the access merging and caching as illustrated in Figure 4.8. In
contrast to RCoal, BCoal has high security even in the presence of MSHRs and caches as
shown both in Table 4.2 and in Section 4.6.1.
4.6.3 Experimental Analysis of Performance
To evaluate the performance and scalability of BCoal scheme against RCoal, we plot the
execution time and number of DRAM accesses in Figure 4.12 for plaintext with 32, 64 and
1024 lines. We first demonstrate the effect of different coalescing strategies in BCoal and
RCoal by comparing them in the absence of MSHRs and caches in Figure 4.12a. We note
that the number of DRAM accesses increases sharply with the plaintext size in RCoal
as compared to BCoal due to the inefficient access coalescing in RCoal. Consequently,
RCoal suffers severe performance degradation as compared to BCoal as the plaintext size
increases.
Figure 4.12b demonstrates the effect of MSHRs and caches on the performance of
BCoal and RCoal. Both schemes show a significant reduction in the DRAM traffic leading
to reduced performance degradation. However, in the presence of MSHRs and caches,
RCoal is insecure (Section 4.3.2) and BCoal is secure (Section 4.6.1 and 4.6.2). For BCoal,
the performance degradation is limited to 5% and 15% for BCoal(1, 16) and BCoal(16),
respectively. In summary, the performance of BCoal (with MSHRs and caches) scales well
with the plaintext size as opposed to secure RCoal (without MSHRs and caches).
4.6.4 Evaluating BCoal on Other Applications
We evaluate BCoal on a wide range of applications from various suites such as CUDA-SDK
(C) [97], Rodinia (R) [13], Lonestar (L) [10], Mars (M) [35], Shoc (S) [18] and Polybench
(P) [108]. For these applications, we evaluate only the performance of BCoal, as the
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Figure 4.12: Performance of BCoal for different plaintext sizes. All results are normalized
to the baseline GPU. c© 2020 IEEE.
bucketing driven reduced variation in the number of coalesced accesses ensures improved
security. The address range of the padded accesses is spread over the entire memory space
of the respective application. We examine the effects of the number and sizes of buckets
on the application performance using Figure 4.13. The MSHRs and caches are enabled
for the evaluation.
Number of buckets. In Figure 4.13, the first two configurations of BCoal, BCoal(1,
16, 32) and BCoal(1, 32), demonstrate the effect of the number of buckets on various
applications. Both configurations have a bucket of size 1 to reduce the DRAM traffic
in applications that exhibit perfect coalescing (i.e, all threads in a warp are served by a
single cache block at a given time). We notice that most applications are unaffected by
the number of buckets, as they can leverage the bucket of size 1 through good coalescing
profiles.
In C-CONS and C-NN, the number of DRAM accesses increase in BCoal(1, 32) as the
number of coalesced accesses between 2 to 31 are padded to meet the bucket 32. The in-
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(b) Execution Time.
Figure 4.13: Performance Evaluation of BCoal on GPGPU applications with MSHRs/-
caches enabled. Results are normalized to the baseline GPU. c© 2020 IEEE.
creased number of accesses in combination with high cache-misses results in increased
DRAM traffic leading to increased performance degradation. In C-TRA, P-CORR and
P-COVAR, although the number of DRAM accesses does not change drastically, the ex-
ecution time increased in BCoal(1, 32) over BCoal(1, 16, 32). The increase in execution
time is attributed to the increase in the number of L1 cache accesses in BCoal(1, 32) as
it lacks the bucket of size 16. The increased L1 accesses, even if cached (thus leading to
fewer DRAM accesses), are satisfied serially thereby increasing the execution time.
Sizes of buckets. BCoal(1, 32) and BCoal(16, 32) demonstrate the effect of bucket
sizes on various applications. We noticed that the performance degradation is severe for
BCoal(16, 32) compared to BCoal(1, 32) due to the increased number of DRAM accesses in
BCoal(16, 32). In BCoal(16, 32), the smallest bucket size is 16, therefore all applications,
even the ones with good coalescing profiles, generate at least 16 DRAM accesses for each
memory access instruction. Subsequently, the number of DRAM accesses increase resulting
in increased performance degradation.
In summary, we observe that the application performance is more affected by the sizes
of buckets than the number of buckets. A careful bucket size selection can reduce the
number of padded requests thereby reducing the overall data movement.
A Generic BCoal configuration. From Figure 4.13, we note that BCoal(1, 16, 32)
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configuration results in only 1.15% average performance loss. The security and perfor-
mance of AES with BCoal(1, 16, 32) is identical to BCoal(1, 16) because the bucket of
size 32 in BCoal(1, 16, 32) is never used as the baseline number of coalesced accesses never
exceed 16 as shown in Figure 4.6a. Therefore, BCoal(1, 16, 32) can be widely adopted as
it offers good security at a minimal performance loss. However, for optimal security and
performance tradeoff, a user can perform application-specific offline profiling of coalesced
accesses (discussed in Section 4.3) to determine appropriate bucket features.
4.7 Related Work
In this section, we highlight the prior works that are the most relevant to this paper.
Attacks. Implementations of cryptographic systems on CPUs are vulnerable to timing
attacks. Several AES implementations contain key-dependent memory accesses, which
eventually affect the status of the data cache. Via cache-probing technique, an attacker
can quickly recover the entire private key of AES and RSA by measuring the execution
time of either a cryptographic algorithm (e.g., [7, 100, 9, 8, 30]) or his/her own application
if the data or instruction cache is shared (e.g., [30, 142, 40, 145]). On GPUs, Jiang et
al. [44] demonstrated a novel complete AES key recovery timing attack that exploits the
coalescing features on a commercial GPU architecture (discussed in Section 4.2.4). They
also developed a new fine-grained timing channel caused by shared memory bank conflicts
in GPUs [45]. Wang et al.[130] developed partial attacks against RCoal[49] focusing on
the configurations with high variance in the number of coalesced accesses. Our BCoal
mechanism further reduces the variance making it a much stronger defense.
Defense mechanisms. Several hardware-based defense mechanisms have been proposed
in the context of CPUs [102, 67, 144, 132, 133, 70, 136]. However, those mechanisms
have been shown to work only for cache-based timing attacks and not for GPU coalescing-
related vulnerabilities. The memory traffic shaping schemes to mitigate the timing attacks
in CPUs have been extensively explored [146, 26, 4]. With the help of fake/dummy access
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generation mechanism, these schemes enforce the memory traffic to follow either a constant
rate or a pre-determined distribution over a time epoch. These schemes differ from BCoal
in two ways. First, BCoal works at a finer instruction-level granularity to shape the
memory traffic. The single-instruction multiple-thread (SIMT) execution model of GPUs
allows parallel thread memory access generation across a warp, which is leveraged by
BCoal to estimate and generate padded accesses for each sensitive instruction. Second,
BCoal ensures that the real and padded accesses are to the same memory space, which
helps in making their individual effects on execution time similar. This makes it harder
for the attacker to distinguish padded accesses from the real accesses.
Lin et al.[68] proposed new software-based mechanisms specific to AES for reducing
the information leakage due to coalescing units. On the other hand, BCoal is a generic
hardware-based coalescing mechanism applicable to all security-sensitive GPGPU applica-
tions that are vulnerable to coalescing-based correlation timing attacks. This also makes
BCoal complementary to other software-based implementations of cryptographic work-
loads. Köpf et al. [56] ensures that the execution time matches one of the discrete bucket
values, while BCoal ensures the number of memory accesses generated per load instruc-
tion conform to a predefined set of values, that is buckets. Further, buckets in the prior
work [56] assumes input blinding for a tight leakage bound. In BCoal, we utilize the in-
herent parallelism in GPUs to randomize the mapping from inputs to threads, achieving
a similar blinding effect for arbitrary applications.
4.8 Conclusions
We propose a bucketing-based coalescing scheme (BCoal) to thwart the coalescing-based
correlation timing attack without incurring high performance overhead. The key insight is
to redesign GPU memory coalescing such that it always issues a pre-determined number
of memory accesses (called buckets). Our modified coalescing unit generates additional
memory accesses (if necessary) along with the real accesses to match the bucket require-
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ments. These additional padded accesses reduce the variance in the total number of
coalesced accesses to significantly enhance the security. BCoal carefully generates padded
accesses such that they have similar caching/merging probability as that of the real ac-
cesses. Such a mechanism significantly helps in retaining the security even in the presence
of the MSHRs and caches. In conclusion, we believe that BCoal addresses the memory





Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) have become an inevitable part of every computing
system due to their ability to provide large improvements in performance and energy ef-
ficiency compared to CPUs [60, 5, 69, 118, 59, 61, 106, 3, 2, 12, 54, 122]. Consequently,
they have become the default choice for accelerating innovations in various fields such as
high-performance computing (HPC), artificial intelligence (AI), and even reliability-critical
autonomous vehicle software [23, 109, 122, 93, 116, 98, 91, 96, 103]. The emerging comput-
ing needs of these domains have fueled the growth of GPU architectures. Especially, the
growing focus on deep learning has increased GPU demands tremendously. Almost every
year AMD and NVIDIA unveil new GPU designs that incorporate significant innovations
to their GPUs leading to improved performance and energy efficiency. For example, the
latest Ampere architecture [99] has an L2 cache size that is 10x larger comparing to pre-
vious generations and new high bandwidth memories are being incorporated into almost
all new GPUs.
The effect of the above innovations on GPU reliability is not yet well-understood.
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For example, advanced DRAM architectures make single-bit and multi-bit faults more
common [120, 125, 85, 86, 87]. Similarly, low voltage cache design proposals (i.e., AMD
Killi [27] or IBM Dante [11]) for managing power consumption of large last-level caches in
GPUs [27, 99] can cause an increased number of multi-bit faults. These multi-bit faults
can lead to catastrophic failures, such as accidents of autonomous vehicles [105, 16, 65, 43].
Unfortunately, the existing ECC mechanisms cannot correct multi-bit faults. SECDED is
only capable of detecting up to two-bit faults and of correcting one-bit fault only. Other
mechanisms such as ChipKill [19] are currently not feasible in GPUs [58]. Popular methods
such as check-pointing [90, 29, 58] come with significant overhead costs due to the large
amounts of data the GPGPU applications typically process [47]. Similarly, redundant
computation techniques, if not carefully performed, can lead to significant overheads in
terms of both performance and energy [21, 129, 31, 75, 137].
In order to provide low-overhead reliability in GPUs, especially in the context of multi-
bit faults, we take a data-centric approach. Based on our extensive application-level anal-
ysis, we find that for a large number of applications, only a limited amount of data needs
additional reliability protection compared to the baseline SECDED. Such data constitutes
a small fraction of the entire application memory, is read-only, and is highly accessed
and shared across the majority of concurrently executing warps. We show that if this
data is subject to multi-bit faults, it can lead to incorrect application output (e.g., high
mis-classifications errors in the case of neural networks) as the faulty data is accessed by
multiple thread instructions across the majority of warps. Interestingly, we observe that
this critical portion of the data can be profiled and this information can then be passed
on to hardware for developing low-overhead correction and detection mechanisms.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that takes a data-centric approach
towards improving GPU reliability while incurring low overhead. In summary, this paper
makes the following contributions:
•We perform detailed application-level analysis to show that a small fraction of critical
data (hot memory blocks) used by a large number of GPGPU application threads can
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dramatically increase thread vulnerability to multi-bit faults. This data is usually read-
only and can be profiled with low-overhead.
• We develop both detection and correction schemes for application resilience that
prioritize reliability fortification of this identified critical data. Our resilience schemes
leverage data information obtained from the application source code and access pattern
for replicating only the hot memory blocks.
• Our reliability management schemes exhibit very limited overhead due to the small
fraction of data that gets replicated and to the fact that the performance overhead of
additional checks (and associated memory accesses) is largely hidden thanks to the latency
tolerance property of GPUs.
Quantitatively, our resilience schemes significantly improve GPU reliability by drop-
ping the number of silent data corruption (SDC) outcomes in the application runs by
98.97% on average, while incurring a low average performance overhead of 1.2% for de-
tection and 3.4% for detection-and-correction scheme.
5.2 Background
In this section, we present a brief overview of the baseline GPU architecture and the
sources of faults in the caches and memory. Finally, we describe the fault injection model
and the error metrics for each application used throughout the paper.
5.2.1 Baseline GPU Architecture
Figure 5.1 shows a generic GPU architecture. It is composed of a set of cores, known as
streaming multiprocessors (SMs) in NVIDIA terminology. Each SM consists of an array of
processing elements (PEs) and several load/store (LD/ST) units. Furthermore, each SM
is associated with an L1 cache shared across the PEs. Next, all SMs on the GPU share
multiple L2 cache banks which are connected through an interconnection network. Each
L2 cache bank is connected to a separate memory channel. Finally, all SMs are supported
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Figure 5.1: A Schematic of the Baseline GPU Architecture. c© 2021 IEEE.
by high-bandwidth off-chip global memory (DRAM). Throughout the paper, we evaluate
the proposed techniques on a cycle-level GPU simulator – GPGPU-Sim [6]. Note that we
assume that caches and memory are already protected by SECDED ECC and hence we
focus only on the effect of multi-bit errors on application output. Table 5.1 provides more
details on the simulated architecture.
Table 5.1: Key configuration parameters of the simulated GPU. c© 2021 IEEE.
Core Features 1400MHz core clock, SIMT width = 32 (16 × 2)
Resources / Core 32KB shared memory, 32KB register file, 15 SMs
L1 Caches / Core 16KB 4-way L1 data cache, 2KB 4-way I-cache
128B cache block size
L2 Caches 16-way 256 KB/memory channel (1536 KB in total),
128B cache block size
Memory Model 6 GDDR5 Memory Controllers, FR-FCFS scheduling
16 DRAM-banks, 924 MHz memory clock
Interconnect 1400MHz interconnect clock
Program Execution Model. A CUDA program consists of multiple functions known
as kernels. A kernel is launched across many threads, where each thread is responsible
for a set of instructions to be processed on the PEs. The threads are organized in groups,
known as Co-operative Thread Arrays (CTAs). The number of CTAs and their size (i.e.,
the number of threads per CTA) are configured by the programmer at the kernel launch
time. Each CTA is assigned to one SM. The number of CTAs assigned per SM is governed
by the resources available per SM. Threads of a CTA are executed on the PEs at a
granularity of warps, where each warp is usually a group of 32 threads. Within a warp,
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all 32 threads are processed in lockstep, executing the same instructions on different data.
5.2.2 Data Memory Faults in GPUs
Hardware faults arise due to particle strikes, temperature/voltage fluctuations, or pro-
cess variations [79]. Prior work has shown that GPUs are susceptible to a variety of
faults [77, 125, 85, 86, 120, 121, 27]. In this work, we focus on faults occurring in the
GPU memory hierarchy. Single-bit and multi-bit faults in the storage cells or the read
logic of the SRAM (cache) and DRAM may cause errors in the stored data [20, 14, 53, 52].
Consequently, the application may read erroneous data resulting in silent data corruption
(SDC) in its output.
The impact of the data memory faults on the application output depends on the
application usage. For example, a memory fault in the GPU while executing a convolution
neural network (CNN) can result in image mis-classification. If the CNN is employed
in self-driving automobiles, then such mis-classification can cause catastrophic results,
including loss of lives. We provide more details on the effects of faults on applications in
Section 5.3.3.
GPUs use (SECDED)-based error checking and correction (ECC) codes to address the
faults in GPU caches and memory [58]. SECDED ECC detects and corrects single-bit
faults, and detects double-bit faults in the application memory. However, the growing
multi-bit faults are harder and expensive to detect and correct. This is the focus of this
paper.
5.2.3 Fault Injection Setup
5.2.3.1 Fault Model
To emulate data memory errors caused by faults in caches and DRAM, we follow the
error emulation framework described by Luo et al. [74]. To this end, we inject faults in
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the data memory blocks allocated by the application address space, irrespective of how
they are mapped in the caches and DRAM. To clearly show the impact of increasing bit
faults, we run two sets of fault injection experiments: first, we inject faults only in a
single memory block. Second, we inject faults in 5 different memory blocks. For brevity,
additional options are not shown.
1 data memory block: We select one 128B data memory block from the application
address space. The memory block selection is determined by the objective of the fault
injection experiment (refer to Sections 5.3.3 and 5.5.2 for details).
5 data memory blocks: Here, we select 5 128B data memory blocks from the application
address space. As in the 1 memory block case, the block selection depends on the objective
of the fault injection experiment.
Within the selected memory block(s), we randomly target a word to inject faults. The
injected faults are modeled as permanent and stuck-at faults. Furthermore, for stuck-at
faults, we assumed that a faulty bit is stuck at either a logical 0 or 1 with equal probability.
To study the effect of multi-bit faults on the application output, we inject either 2-bit,
3-bit, or 4-bit faults at random bit locations within the target word. For each setting, we
execute 1000 runs to achieve statistically significant results [62, 33, 88].
5.2.3.2 Error Metric Selection
The faults in the data memory blocks may go undetected by SECDED-ECC in GPUs
and cause an incorrect application output. This is a case of silent data corruption (SDC).
To identify whether a fault-injected application run results in an SDC output, we adopt
metrics tailored to each application. For the applications from the Polybench suite, the
output is either a single- or multi-dimensional vector. To determine whether the output
is an SDC, we note how many vector elements deviate from the fault-free baseline output
vector. Applications from the Axbench suite generate images as output. Therefore, we
compare the output image from a fault-injected run with the output image from the fault-
free baseline run. Table 5.2 details the error metric selected for each application. For each
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Table 5.2: Output Error Metrics for Applications. c© 2021 IEEE.
Application Output Format Error Metric
C-NN Vector Classifications Percentage of Mis-sclassifications in
output.
P-BICG Result Vector Percentage of output vector elements





Normalized Root Mean Square Error
compared to the baseline image.
A-Meanfilter Filtered Image
A-Sobel Edge Detected Image
A-SRAD Image
application, we set a threshold value (either directly provided by the benchmark suite or
reasonably set based on the application behavior) to determine output quality, that is,
whether the application run resulted in an SDC outcome.
5.3 Motivation and Workload Analysis
In this section, we first highlight the problem of increasing memory faults in GPUs. Next,
we analyze the application memory access pattern and illustrate that a small fraction of
data memory (hot memory) in GPGPU applications is highly accessed and shared across
multiple warps. Finally, we demonstrate the vulnerability of GPGPU applications to faults
in hot memory.
5.3.1 Problem Definition and Goals of This Work
Current Trends. Innovations in GPU memory systems lead to tremendous growth
in performance and energy efficiency. For example, the on-chip GPU cache sizes are
consistently increasing across GPU generations to accommodate increasing working data
sets, see Figure 5.2. From the DRAM perspective, memory bandwidth and capacity are
growing consistently. Advanced high-bandwidth memories (HBM) in GPUs now have up
to sustained bandwidth of 1-2 TB/sec with capacities of 16-32GB [99].
Unfortunately, the effect of memory innovations on GPU reliability is not well under-
stood. Recent efforts are directed towards reducing on-chip power mainly by operating
the caches at near-threshold voltage [28, 27] but such reduction leads to a significant in-





















Figure 5.2: L2 Cache size trends for NVIDIA and AMD GPUs. c© 2021 IEEE.
crease in multi-bit faults [28]. Previous studies have demonstrated that SECDED ECC
is not sufficient to mitigate faults in DRAM [77, 120, 121]. Sridharan et al. [120, 121]
showed through a field study that DRAM failures are dominated by permanent faults
rather than transient faults and result in faulty data. Another field study by Martino et
al. [77] compares CPU and GPU error rates and demonstrates that GPUs are three-orders
of magnitude more susceptible to errors than CPUs.
Our goals. In this work, we aim to devise performance-efficient resilience schemes to ad-
dress the multi-bit faults in L2-caches and DRAM. Since GPUs operate on large amounts
of data in parallel, addressing the faults in the entire memory space incurs high perfor-
mance and storage overhead [21]. Aiming to minimize this overhead, we propose a selective
memory protection technique that is based on the observation that protecting only a small
fraction of the data memory against multi-bit faults is sufficient to provide high reliabil-
ity. To illustrate the above, we first analyze the memory access pattern of applications to
identify if there is a fraction of memory with a high number of accesses comparing to the
rest of the memory blocks. We show that this data is highly accessed and shared across
multiple warps. We term the memory blocks of this highly accessed and shared fraction
of the memory hot memory blocks. Next, we show that faults in hot memory blocks can
result in silent data corruption (SDC) of the application output. Finally, we develop mech-
anisms to identify the hot memory blocks. Our analysis of several application codes shows
that the hot memory blocks are usually read-only, constitute a very small fraction of the
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Figure 5.3: Normalized number of accesses to data memory blocks. For (a)-(f), we note
that very few memory blocks experience a very high number of RD accesses compared to
other blocks. c© 2021 IEEE.
total application memory, and can be identified quickly. Using these insights, we pro-
pose two selective memory protection mechanisms, where we duplicate/triplicate the hot
memory blocks to achieve low-overhead detection/correction schemes. We also show how
reliability-performance trade-offs can be achieved by adjusting the amount of replication.
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5.3.2 Application Access Pattern Analysis
Application Selection. To evaluate the impact of the proposed resilience schemes, we
focus on applications with a clear and quantifiable output. Applications are drawn from
popular benchmark suites including CUDA-SDK [97], Polybench [108], and Axbench [143].
We also ensure that the selected applications show variability in terms of memory access
patterns.
Application Classification based on Access Pattern. We examine the read (RD)
accesses to the data memory blocks from the application address space. We focus on the
RD accesses as they are the most dominant ones in the memory access pattern. We analyze
the access count to each memory block of the application under observation. In Figure 5.3,
we show example plots for 8 applications, where the RD access counts to each memory
block are sorted from low to high. Based on the access patterns in Figure 5.3, we split the
applications into two primary categories. First, for applications in Figure 5.3(a)-(f), we
note that few memory blocks account for a high number of RD accesses. Specifically, for
C-NN, the memory block with the highest number of RD accesses has 4732-times more
RD accesses than the memory block with the least number of RD accesses. On the other
hand, for applications in Figure 5.3(g)-(h), we note that no memory blocks have high RD
accesses compared to the rest of the memory blocks. For example, for C-BlackScholes, the
numbers of accesses across different memory blocks are equal. Lastly, for P-GRAMSCHM,
the number of accesses increases in small steps, and therefore, there are no memory blocks
with a disproportionally high number of RD accesses.
Here, we focus on applications demonstrating access profiles similar to those shown
in Figure 5.3(a)-(f), where a small number of memory blocks accounts for a very high
number of RD accesses compared to the rest of the memory blocks. Table 5.2 lists the
selected applications.
Observation I: For several GPGPU applications, a small number of data memory blocks
incurs a very high number of read (RD) accesses as compared to the rest of the memory
blocks.
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Warp-level Spread of Highly Accessed Data. Next, we profile the RD accesses of
applications listed in Table 5.2 to see if the highly accessed data memory blocks are always
shared across multiple warps. To this end, we plot the number of warps accessing the data
memory blocks, with memory blocks sorted by the total number of RD accesses from low
to high, see Figure 5.4.



































































































Figure 5.4: Percentage of active warps accessing the data memory blocks. c© 2021 IEEE.
Figure 5.4(a)-(b) (P-BICG and A-Laplacian), show that the highly accessed memory
blocks are also shared across all the active warps. This trend is representative of all
applications in this study except for C-NN and A-SRAD. For C-NN and A-SRAD, see
Figure 5.4(c)-(d), we note that while the highly accessed data memory blocks are not
shared across all warps, they are still highly shared across multiple warps when compared
to the rest of the memory blocks.
Observation II: Highly accessed data memory blocks are typically shared across a large
number of warps compared to the rest of the memory blocks accessed by the applications.
Therefore, an error in the hot memory blocks (that are highly accessed and shared) can
spread across a large number of warps, making output degradation increasingly likely.





























Figure 5.5: Fault injection methodology to evaluate application vulnerability of hot
memory blocks to the memory faults. The data memory blocks are sorted based on the
total number of accesses to each block. c© 2021 IEEE.
5.3.3 Impact of Faults in Data Memory
Having identified the hot memory blocks in Section 5.3.2, here we test our hypothesis
that faults in these hot memory blocks likely cause an SDC of the application output.
Figure 5.5 illustrates our fault injection setup to demonstrate the effect of faults in the
hot memory blocks as compared to the rest of the memory blocks. The data memory blocks
are divided into two categories based on the access count profile shown in Figure 5.3: hot
memory blocks and the rest of the memory blocks ( 1 ). As explained in Section 5.2.3, we
do two distinct experiments: 1) with 1 block for fault injections per run and 2) with 5
blocks for fault injections per run. To demonstrate the likelihood of SDC output if faults
occur in the hot memory blocks, we select random data memory blocks only from the
hot memory blocks. We randomly target a word within each selected block ( 2 ) and then
inject faults at random bit locations in the target word ( 3 ). Next, to show the likelihood
of SDC output if faults are injected in the rest of the memory blocks, we select random
data memory blocks only from that space for fault injection.
We compare the SDC of the application output in both cases. Figure 5.6 shows the
number of SDC outcomes for the hot memory blocks and the rest of the memory blocks.
For all applications, we notice a clear trend: the number of SDC outcomes increases as
the number of faults for the selected data memory blocks increase. Furthermore, as the
number of faulty data memory blocks increase (5 faulty blocks vs 1 faulty block), the
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Figure 5.6: Effect of faults in the hot (highly accessed/shared) memory blocks versus
the rest of the memory blocks on the application output. c© 2021 IEEE.
Observation III: Faults in the hot memory blocks likely result in more SDCs in the
application output comparing to faults in the rest of the memory blocks. Furthermore,
as the number of faulty data memory blocks and/or the number of bit faults per data
memory block increases, the probability of an SDC output increases.
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5.4 Data-centric Reliablity Management: Analysis, Design,
and Implementation
In this section, we describe the application source code analysis to identify hot data
objects. Based on this analysis, we introduce two resilience schemes that prioritize the
hot memory for reliability protection to minimize SDCs while incurring low performance
loss.
5.4.1 Application Source Code Analysis
As noted in Observation III, the hot memory blocks must be prioritized for reliability
protection. Therefore, we first identify to which input data objects in the application
source code these hot memory blocks belong. We start by examining the read-only data
objects in the application source code against the load instructions in the corresponding
PTX code. Here, we provide the analysis for the three representative applications –
namely, P-BICG, C-NN, and A-Laplacian.
We begin with P-BICG. The relatively simple source code of this application facilitates
understanding the access pattern to the data objects of interest. P-BICG application
accepts three read-only input data objects– A, r and q – for two CUDA kernel functions.
Listing 5.1 shows the source code for the first kernel, bicg kernel1, which accepts A
and r. From Listing 5.1, we note that A and r are accessed by each thread of a kernel
in a for-loop on line 14. After examining the PTX code for P-BICG in relation to the
addresses of the hot memory blocks, we note that only the memory blocks of data object
r are highly accessed. This can be seen by examining the access patterns of A and r with
respect to their access indices, [i * NY + j] and [i], respectively. Note that the offset
for the index of the data objects A increases by a large value of i * NY + j. Consequently,
the data memory blocks of A show low locality, and hence are not highly accessed and
shared. On the other hand, the index of r increases by a small value of i, which results
in uniformly strided accesses with a high locality. Consequently, the data memory blocks
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of r are highly accessed. We notice a similar access pattern for q in the second kernel of
P-BICG. Out of three read-only input data objects to P-BICG, r and q experience a very
high number of accesses and are shared across multiple warps.
Listing 5.1: First Kernel in P-BICG.
1 #de f i n e NX 3072
2 #de f i n e NY 3072
3
4 g l o b a l void b i c g k e rn e l 1 ( f l o a t ∗A, f l o a t ∗r , f l o a t ∗ s )
5 {
6 in t j = blockIdx . x ∗ blockDim . x + threadIdx . x ;
7
8 i f ( j < NY)
9 {
10 s [ j ] = 0 .0 f ;
11 i n t i ;
12 f o r ( i = 0 ; i < NX; i++)
13 {




Next, we analyze source code and the corresponding PTX code of C-NN and observe
that the data objects Layer1 Weights and Layer2 Weights, which are inputs to the
kernel functions of the first (shown in Listing 5.2) and second (not shown here) layers
of C-NN, are highly accessed and shared across different warps. Here, we focus only on
Layer1 Weights which incurs the highest number of accesses. Note that Layer1 Weights
is accessed on lines 11 and 15 in FirstLayer kernel of C-NN, see Listing 5.2. The access
generated by a thread of a block on line 11 is to the same data element of Layer1 Weights
across threads of a cooperative thread array (CTA)-block. As a result, the corresponding
data memory blocks of Layer1 Weights experience a high number of accesses from a
large number of threads from different warps. The next access to Layer1 Weights on
line 15 is inside a for-loop. Additionally, the offset to the index is regular and small
([weightBegin+i]). Consequently, as noted for P-BICG, this results in uniformly strided
accesses to the data memory blocks of Layer1 Weights. Since a large number of threads
execute the corresponding for-loop, the data memory blocks of Layer1 Weights get a very
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high number of accesses. This is also true for the data memory blocks of Layer2 Weights
in the next kernel of C-NN.
Listing 5.2: First layer in C-NN.
1
2 g l o b a l void F i r s tLayer ( f l o a t ∗Layer1 Neurons , f l o a t ∗Layer1 Weights , f l o a t ∗Layer2 Neurons )
3 {
4 in t blockID=blockIdx . x ;
5 i n t pixelX=threadIdx . x ;
6 i n t pixelY=threadIdx . y ;
7 i n t weightBegin=blockID ∗26;
8 i n t windowX=pixelX ∗2 ;
9 i n t windowY=pixelY ∗2 ;
10 f l o a t r e s u l t =0;
11 r e s u l t+=Layer1 Weights [ weightBegin ] ;
12 ++weightBegin ;
13 f o r ( i n t i =0; i <25;++ i )
14 {
15 r e s u l t+=Layer1 Neurons [ ( windowY∗29+windowX+kernelTemplate [ i ] ) +(29∗29∗ blockIdx . y ) ]∗
Layer1 Weights [ weightBegin+i ] ;
16 }
17 r e s u l t =(1.7159∗ tanhf (0 .66666667∗ r e s u l t ) ) ;
18 Layer2 Neurons [ (13∗13∗ blockID+pixelY∗13+pixelX )+(13∗13∗6∗ blockIdx . y ) ]= r e s u l t ;
19 }
Lastly, we examine the source code of A-Laplacian shown in Listing 5.3. The ac-
cess profile (Figure 5.3(d)) identifies the data memory blocks of the filter data object
d LaplacianMatrix as the most highly accessed (see line 24) In contrast to P-BICG and
C-NN, the index offset of d LaplacianMatrix does not change linearly. However, since
the entire d LaplacianMatrix fits in one memory block, its accesses converge to that
memory block. Consequently, the data memory block of d LaplacianMatrix is highly
accessed and shared across multiple warps. Following d LaplacianMatrix, width, and
height are the next most highly accessed and shared data objects.
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Listing 5.3: Filter Kernel in A-Laplacian.
1 g l o b a l void Lap l a c i anF i l t e r ( P ixe l ∗ g DataIn , P ixe l ∗ g DataOut ,
2 i n t ∗ width , i n t ∗ height , f l o a t ∗ d LaplacianMatrix )
3 {
4 s h a r e d Pixe l sharedMem [BLOCK HEIGHT∗BLOCK WIDTH] ;
5 i n t x = blockIdx . x ∗ TILE WIDTH + threadIdx . x ;
6 i n t y = blockIdx . y ∗ TILE HEIGHT + threadIdx . y ;
7 i f ( x < FILTER RADIUS | | x > ∗width − FILTER RADIUS − 1 | | y < FILTER RADIUS | | y >
∗he ight − FILTER RADIUS − 1)
8 {
9 in t index = y ∗ (∗width ) + x ;
10 g DataOut [ index ] = g DataIn [ index ] ;
11 return ;
12 }
13 in t index = y ∗ (∗width ) + x ;
14 i n t sharedIndex = threadIdx . y ∗ blockDim . y + threadIdx . x ;
15 sharedMem [ sharedIndex ] = g DataIn [ index ] ;
16 sync th r eads ( ) ;
17 i f ( threadIdx . x >= FILTER RADIUS && threadIdx . x < BLOCK WIDTH − FILTER RADIUS &&
threadIdx . y >= FILTER RADIUS && threadIdx . y < BLOCK HEIGHT − FILTER RADIUS)
18 {
19 f l o a t sum = 0 ;
20 f o r ( i n t dy = −FILTER RADIUS ; dy <= FILTER RADIUS ; ++dy)
21 f o r ( i n t dx = −FILTER RADIUS ; dx <= FILTER RADIUS ; ++dx)
22 {
23 f l o a t c en t e rP i x e l = ( f l o a t ) ( sharedMem [ sharedIndex + (dy ∗ blockDim . x + dx
) ] ) ;
24 sum += cen t e rP ix e l ∗ d LaplacianMatrix [ ( dy + FILTER RADIUS) ∗
FILTER DIAMETER + (dx+FILTER RADIUS) ] ;
25 }
26 Pixe l r e s = max(0 , min ( ( P ixe l )sum , 255) ) ;
27 g DataOut [ index ] = re s ;
28 }
29 }
We performed similar application source code analysis for all applications studied
here. Table 5.3 lists the read-only input data objects for the GPU kernel functions of each
application along with their respective sizes. The data objects are ordered from high to
low in terms of the number of accesses, those identified as hot data objects are in bold
and can be identified by examining the application source code. Lastly, from Table 5.3,
we note that while the hot data objects are highly accessed and shared, they occupy
significantly less space than the rest of the data objects combined. For example, in C-NN,
the hot data objects, that is Layer1 weights and Layer1 Weights, occupy only 2.15% of
the total application data memory. We notice a similar trend across all applications.
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We also performed runtime temporal analysis on the accesses to the hot data objects.
Since, in most applications, accesses to the data objects are uniformly strided with small
offset, the accesses have high temporal locality (e.g., for P-BICG). For other applications
such as A-Laplacian, since the hot data objects are small enough to fit in few data memory
blocks, accesses to these exhibit high temporal locality.
Table 5.3: Input data objects to the GPU applications. Data objects are sorted based
on the number of accesses incurred (Highest to Lowest). The emboldened data objects
are classified as hot data objects (highly accessed and shared). c© 2021 IEEE.




Percentage of accesses to
hot memory blocks w.r.t.
the total number of ac-
cesses
C-NN Layer1 Weights,
Layer2 Weights, Layer3 Weights,
Layer4 Weights, Images
2.15 34.99
P-BICG p, r, A 0.064 5.7
P-GESUMMV x, A, B 0.025 4.8
P-MVT y1, y2, a 0.048 5.8
A-Laplacian Filter, Filter Height, Fil-
ter Width, Image
0.001 73
A-Meanfilter Filter Height, Filter Width, Im-
age
0.0001 39.89
A-Sobel Filter, Filter Height, Fil-
ter Width, Image
0.001 73
A-SRAD i N, i S, i E, i W, Image 0.86 39.67
Observation IV: Through offline application source code analysis, the hot data objects
forming the hot memory blocks can be identified. Furthermore, these hot data objects
have a very small memory footprint (at the most 2.15%) compared to the rest of the
data objects. Lastly, the hot data objects experience high temporal locality.
Note that this analysis can be adapted for other applications using available binary
instrumentation tools for GPUs [127, 1]. The binary instrumentation tools offer two useful
functionalities: First, the memory tracing functionality can be extended to identify the
hot memory blocks. Second, the application instruction profiling at the binary level can
help to identify the hot data objects. The access pattern and source code analyses are
done once offline, and therefore, have no runtime overhead.
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5.4.2 Detection and Correction Resilience Schemes
We leverage the information related to hot memory blocks (Observations I, II, and IV)
to devise detection/correction schemes. We particularly focus on Observation III that
demonstrates that the hot data objects must be prioritized for protection against multi-
bit faults. As discussed in Section 5.3, the proposed resilience schemes target multi-bit
faults in L2-cache and DRAM. Our resilience schemes complement the existing SECDED-
ECC protection.
5.4.2.1 Multi-bit Fault Detection
As the read-only hot data objects prioritized for protection are smaller in size compared
to the total application memory (refer to Table 5.3), we replicate the hot data objects for
“protection”. Replication allows to easily identify the multi-bit faults by comparing their
two copies.
Given an application, we first sort the data objects based on the number of their
accesses and identify the hot data objects (this is done with a one-time offline source code
analysis as described in Section 5.4.1). For the applications studied in this work, Table 5.3
lists all the data objects per application sorted from high to low number of accesses. The
hot data objects to be prioritized for reliability protection are emboldened.
Next, we duplicate the selected data objects in the GPU DRAM at two distinct loca-
tions. During the application execution, if a memory access to the data memory blocks of
one of the reliability-protected data objects is an L1-cache hit, then the normal operation
takes place where the data is returned to the corresponding SM core. However, if the
access is an L1-cache miss, then the LD/ST unit at the L1-cache generates two accesses,
each to one of the two copies of the data memory block. Once both accesses return data
to L1-cache, the copies of data are compared bit-wise to identify any multi-bit faults. If a
bit mismatch is identified, then our reliability scheme generates a terminate signal to the
GPU application causing the application to exit early and notify the user. In this case,
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the user is expected to rerun the application.
Since the detection-only scheme duplicates the L1-cache missed accesses to the data
memory blocks of selected read-only data objects, the main source of performance loss
is the additional accesses going to the L2-cache and DRAM. To minimize performance
loss, we leverage the fact that this is a detection-only scheme: if the protected data is
corrupted, then the application is terminated. Therefore, it is not necessary to wait for
both copies of the data to arrive before proceeding with the application execution. Instead,
we devise a lazy bit comparison: once we receive the first data copy for a corresponding
load instruction, the execution moves forward. As soon as the second copy is received,
then the lazy comparison is performed to check for multi-bit faults. Consequently, any
performance loss is minimized as the execution is not stalled.
5.4.2.2 Multi-bit Fault Detection-and-Correction
We next describe the second resilience scheme which not only detects multi-bit faults but
also corrects them. To detect and correct the multi-bit faults, we employ a majority vote
mechanism that is implemented via data triplication. Each copy is stored at a distinct
location in the GPU DRAM with distinct memory addresses. For each L1-cache missed
access for the data object covered under the reliability scheme, we generate three accesses
to the L2-cache. Once all three accesses are returned to the LD/ST unit at the L1-
cache, we perform a three-way bitwise comparison on the received data copies. During
the comparison, if all the data copies have the same bits indicating no bit fault, then the
application execution moves forward. If a bit mismatch is observed in one of the copies
indicating a bit fault, then based on the majority vote the offending bit is changed to the
correct value. The corrected bit value is used for the computation. Since the data copies
are stored at distinct locations, the probability of the same bit fault occurring in all three
data copies is minimal.
In this detection and correction scheme, we wait for all three data copies to be received
in order to perform the three-way comparison for data correction. Consequently, the two
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sources of performance loss are 1) the increased number of memory accesses due to the
three accesses to the data and 2) the stall times when the LD/ST unit at L1-cache waits
for all three accesses to return with data. For the set of applications examined here, we
do not observe a significant performance loss, because the size of the input data objects
prioritized for the reliability improvement is small as shown in Table 5.3.
5.4.3 Implementation Overhead
In Section 5.4.1, we identified the hot data objects via manual application of source code
analysis. For an unknown application, the same access pattern analysis can be automated
with the assistance of binary instrumentation tools, such as NVBit [127]. Note that this
information collection is a one-time process and typically done offline. Based on the
profiled information, the following steps are performed.
First, we replicate the data objects protected by our resilience schemes in GPU DRAM
(either two or three times, depending on our target). We store the start addresses of each
copy of the data object. These start addresses are used to generate the replication accesses
to the required data index within the data object. To do so, we add the memory offset
calculated for the original memory access to the respective start address. For each data
object, we need either 32 bits or (2 × 32 =) 64 bits to store the start addresses in the
detection-only and detection-and-correction, respectively. We allocate 128 bytes for the
start address storage, which accommodates (128B/(32×4) =) 32 and (128B/(2×32×4) =)
16 data objects for detection and detection/correction, respectively. In our analysis, the
maximum number of data objects to a GPU application never exceeds five (Table 5.3).
We use a 32-bit adder to compute the data index mentioned above for the copy accesses.
Second, to replicate the L1-cache missed accesses to the protected data objects, we
track their respective load instructions. To do so, we store the addresses of load instruc-
tions to the corresponding data objects in the LD/ST unit near L1-cache. Each load
instruction needs 32 bits to store its address. We allocate 128 bytes for the instruction
address storage, which accommodates (128B/(32 × 4) =) 32 load instruction addresses.
CHAPTER 5. RELIABILITY THROUGH ACCESS REPLICATION 101
In our applications, the number of load instructions does not exceed 22. The LD/ST
unit checks the program counter to see if one of the load instructions to the protected
data objects experiences a miss, in which case, additional accesses are generated to the
copies of data objects. To compare the data copies, we use a 256-bit wide comparator for
comparing the data at 32B granularity. Lastly, we allocate 128 bytes to store at most 32
load instructions awaiting the comparison of their data copies at the LD/ST unit. Note
that all overheads associated with the data movement and stalls are modeled and final
results already include these overheads.
5.5 Experimental Results
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the proposed detection-only and detection-
and-correction resilience schemes using the applications listed in Table 5.2.
5.5.1 Performance Evaluation
Note that the results presented in this subsection come from one profiling run only. Fig-
ure 5.7 plots for each application a) the execution time for each application and b) the
L1-cache missed accesses. All metrics in Figure 5.7 are plotted normalized to the baseline
case (i.e., the baseline execution with no resilience scheme). Therefore, the “1.0” value on
the y-axis in each plot represents the baseline value. Note that the numeric values on the
x-axis correspond to the cumulative number of data objects covered under the resilience
schemes. The data objects covered are by their order of importance as shown in Table 5.3.
For example, for C-NN, “1” corresponds to Layer1 weights, while “2” corresponds to
Layer1 weights and Layer2 weights, and so on.
5.5.1.1 Detection-Only
For evaluating performance, we focus on the overhead due to the duplication of accesses in
the detection-only resilience scheme. Therefore, we ignore the cases where data memory
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Figure 5.7: Performance overhead of Detection-only (dark bar) and Detection-and-
Correction (white bar) resilience schemes. All numbers are normalized to the baseline
case (no reliability protection, 1.0). The hot data objects reside in hot memory blocks. c©
2021 IEEE.
errors result in application crashes. From Figure 5.7, we make the following observations.
First, across all applications, as the number of data objects covered by the detection-
only resilience scheme increases, the respective application execution times increase. This
loss in performance is consistent with the increase in L1-cache missed accesses due to
duplication. Second, the L1-cache missed accesses increase fractionally when we cover
only the hot data objects, which is attributed to their small memory footprint in addition
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to their spatial and temporal locality (Observation IV). Lastly, the detection-only scheme
implements a lazy bit-wise evaluation, where application execution proceeds when any
copy of the duplicated data arrives at the LD/ST unit of L1-cache. (Recall that the
execution does not stall awaiting both accesses to arrive.) Therefore, when only the hot
data objects are protected, the corresponding performance loss on average is only 1.2%,
see Figure 5.7. In contrast, when all data objects are protected, the average performance
loss becomes 40.65% due to the steep increase in duplicated accesses.
5.5.1.2 Detection-and-Correction
We make the following observations from Figure 5.7 regarding the detection-and-correction
scheme. First, similar to the detection-only scheme, as the number of protected data ob-
jects increases, the L1-cache missed accesses increase but this increase is larger comparing
to detection-only. This is expected as accesses are now triplicated. In addition, to correct
the fault(s), execution is stalled for all three accesses to arrive with data. Consequently,
the execution time increases as a function of the volume of the protected data objects.
It is interesting to note that when we enable detection-and-correction for hot data
objects only, the corresponding average performance loss is only 3.4% as the increase in
the number of L1-cache missed accesses is still minimal (almost at the same level as for
the detection-only scheme). If all application data objects were to be triplicated, the
average performance loss shoots to 74.24%. Overall, the performance loss triggered by
the detection-and-correction is much higher than for the detection-only scheme if all data
objects are protected but it is nearly at the same level with detection-only if only hot data
objects are protected.
5.5.2 Reliability Evaluation
We evaluate the two resilience schemes based on the percentage of SDC outcomes for
1000 fault injection experiments. Recall that this number of experiments is necessary
to achieve results of statistical significance (95% confidence intervals with ±3% error




























Figure 5.8: Fault injection for evaluating fault detection-and-correction: the probability
of a memory block selection depends on the number of its L1-missed accesses (since the
proposed schemes address faults in L2-caches and DRAM). c© 2021 IEEE.
margins) [62, 33].
We inject faults in the entire application memory space, see Figure 5.8. Specifically,
for reliability evaluation, we select the data memory block(s) where the faults are to be
injected based on its number of L1-missed accesses (a missed access forces bringing data
from L2-caches and DRAM which are highly susceptible to faults) during an application
run ( 1 ). Recall that we perform two distinct experiments: 1) with 1 block for fault
injections per run and 2) with 5 blocks for fault injections per run (see Section 5.2.3). We
randomly target a word within the selected memory block(s) for fault injections ( 2 ) and
then inject faults at random bit locations in the selected word ( 3 ).
Figure 5.9 plots the number of SDC outcomes versus the (cumulative) number of data
objects protected by the resilience schemes. Across all applications, the baseline case with
no enabled resilience scheme is more susceptible to faults. As we cumulatively protect more
data objects, the number of SDC outcomes reduces. When either the per memory block
bit faults or the number of faulty memory blocks increases, the number of SDC outcomes
increases as well. Across all applications, protecting hot data objects with the proposed
resilience schemes decreases the number of SDC outcomes significantly (an average drop
of 98.97%) across all fault injection configurations.1
1In some cases, we observe that the number of SDC outcomes is less than 3% (the statistical error
margins). However, the majority of cases, especially at higher fault rates, demonstrate clear benefits of
our schemes.
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Figure 5.9: Silent data corruption due to faults in L2-cache and DRAM: The x-axis
represents the number of protected data objects cumulatively increasing, starting from the
baseline case (no data objects are protected). The y-axis shows the number of SDC outputs
out of 1000 runs for each error injection configuration. The detection-only/dectection-
and-correction schemes stop the multi-bit data memory errors caused by the faults from
propagating to the output. c© 2021 IEEE.
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5.5.3 Reliability and Performance Tradeoff
Figure 5.9 shows that in the absence of resilience schemes, GPGPU applications are highly
vulnerable to multiple memory faults. Yet, as we cumulatively protect an increasing num-
ber of data objects, the number of SDC outcomes decreases, but at a small performance
cost. Figure 5.7 shows that since the focus is on protecting a limited number of hot data
objects, the performance degradation due to protection is indeed minimal. Across all ap-
plications, with the detection-and-correction (the detection-only) scheme, on average hot
memory blocks can be protected with a performance loss of only 3.4% (1.2%) resulting in
a 98.97% drop in the number of SDC outcomes. On the contrary, if all data are protected
the performance loss becomes 74.24% (40.7%). By selecting the number of data objects
to be protected and especially when protection is applied to hot data objects only, the
desired reliability and performance tradeoff can be achieved.
5.6 Related Works
To our knowledge, this is the first work that makes a case for data-centric reliability
management in GPUs. In this section, we briefly discuss the works that are most related
to ours.
Memory/Cache Errors. Sridharan et al. [120] discovered that almost half of the DRAM
faults are multi-bit failures, and more than 50% of the DRAM faults are permanent. Tiwari
et al. [125] showed through a large scale GPU study that GPU DRAM is most vulnerable
to multi-bit errors compared to the rest of GPU hardware. Furthermore, two independent
studies demonstrate the necessity of improved ECC, such as Chipkill, instead of SECDED
due to increasing multi-bit errors in DRAMs [77, 121]. Due to increasing cache sizes,
several efforts have been developed to operate caches at low voltage to improve power
efficiency. Recent works have demonstrated experimentally that bit faults increase as
the operating voltage of the cache reduces [28, 11, 27]. In this paper, we address these
multi-bit faults in cache/memory via low-overhead detection/correction mechanisms.
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Error Injection Studies. GPU-Qin injects fault at the micro-architecture level to sim-
ulate transient faults in GPUs, excluding caches and memory [24, 25]. LLFI [64] is an
LLVM compiler-based fault injection framework for GPUs, where an intermediate repre-
sentation is modified to simulate error injection. SASSIFI [33] directly injects faults into
low-level SASS instructions. PCFI [110] inject errors in different parts of instructions to
simulate errors in the GPU register files and memory. Unlike the compiler-based meth-
ods used in GPU-Qin and SASSIFI, Tselonis et al. [126] propose GUFI to validate the
feasibility of using the commonly used GPGPU simulator, GPGPU-Sim [6] to study the
reliability of GPGPU applications. Nie et al. [88] propose a fault-site pruning mechanism
that dramatically reduces the number of required fault-injection experiments in GPGPU
applications to obtain results of high statistical significance, this pruning methodology is
also adapted for multi-bit faults [138]. SUGAR [139] speeds up the evaluation of GPGPU
application error resilience by judicious input sizing and illustrates how analyzing a small
fraction of the input is sufficient to estimate application resilience with high accuracy while
dramatically reducing experimentation time.
Reliability Solutions. Redundant computations by modifying source code are explored
for fault tolerance as GPUs have a large number of on-chip cores [21]. Thread remap-
ping into reliable and unreliable warps can facilitate partial replication mechanisms for
error detection/correction at the warp level and shows superior performance to standard
duplication/triplication [137]. Nie et al. [84] show that when a quantifiable loss in out-
put quality is acceptable to the user, one can reduce the overhead of protection/recovery
mechanisms by taking advantage of resilience patterns of threads at different hierarchies
(i.e., kernel/thread-block/warp). Compiler-based redundant multithreading (RMT) com-
pares the outputs from replicated computations for error detection, albeit with a highly
variable performance loss [129, 31]. Mahmoud et al. [75] introduce a replication algorithm
to duplicate select GPU instructions while maintaining low performance loss. Another
approach for fault-tolerance is checkpoint-restart, where upon the fault occurrence the
application restarts from the last checkpoint [90, 29]. However, the associated overhead
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of the checkpoint-restart mechanism is prohibitive [58].
For caches operating at low voltage, Killi [27] offers a variable ECC mechanism for a
subset of L2 cache lines, while disabling the cache lines with more than one fault at the
cost of cache capacity. Chandramoorthy et al. [11] implement a boosted SRAM cache,
where the cache voltage is boosted for each read and write operation.
Prior works suggest heterogeneous reliability solutions for CPU workloads [38, 74,
63, 73, 32]. Hukerikar et al. [38] devise a software-based parity mechanism to improve
the reliability of critical program objects in HPC applications. Luo et al. [74] show that
applications exhibit different memory error resiliency based on the error location in DRAM
and propose a hardware/software mechanism to enhance memory reliability. Li et al. [63]
profile scientific applications to relate changes in application behavior and the location
and frequency of error. SDCTune [73] identifies and protects SDC-prone program data
based on static and dynamic features. Hari et al. [32] deploy low-cost program detectors in
the SDC-crucial section of the program to identify and reduce SDCs. Ranger [15] restricts
output values of selected layers in CNNs to minimize error propagation to improve CNN
resilience.
The schemes proposed in this work complement the SECDED ECC by detecting and
correcting multi-bit faults in the GPU L2 cache and DRAM. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work that identifies the most vulnerable data in the context of GPGPU
application resilience. Based on this information, our schemes protect the highly-used
input data objects and provide improved reliability at a low overhead.
5.7 Conclusions
Multi-bit faults are typically an unwanted side-effect of GPU memory performance inno-
vations. In this paper, we perform an in-depth application-level analysis of memory access
patterns and show that a large number of applications work on a limited number of hot
data objects of highly-accessed data, which are also shared by a majority of warps. Such
CHAPTER 5. RELIABILITY THROUGH ACCESS REPLICATION 109
highly accessed and shared data is vulnerable to faults potentially leading to silent data
corruption in the application output. We show that as hot data objects constitute a small
fraction of the total memory footprint, protecting them against faults is an inexpensive
solution that provides high application resilience in the presence of multi-bit faults.
Chapter 6
Exploration of the Reliability of
ML Models
The emerging machine learning (ML) models are becoming increasingly complex. As a
result, the ML models need larger storage space and are getting slower. Consequently,
several optimizations have been introduced to reduce the ML model size and the execution
times. The popular optimizations include weight compression [22], weight pruning [140]
and weight quantization [134]. However, the reliability of ML models in the presence of
these optimizations is not explored in detail. To bridge this gap, this chapter explores the
reliability of ML models that employ weight quantization.
6.1 Advantages of Weight Quantization in ML Models
This initial study specifically focuses on the weight quantization of the machine learning
models, where the data type of weight parameters is quantized from the default 32-bit
floating-point (FP32) to a smaller data type, for example, 8-bit integer (INT8). We
evaluate the effect of the weight quantization on the model size, execution time, and
classification accuracy across different ML models using the ImageNet dataset [115]. We
use PyTorch [104] Framework for the evaluation. The results are summarized in Table 6.1.
110
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FP32 INT8 FP32 INT8
AlexNet [57] 5 234 59 4.02X 56.624 56.092
VGG19 [119] 16 575 144 5.26X 72.36 47.146
ResNet50 [36] 53 103 76 18.55X 76.012 75.854
InceptionV3 [123] 94 109 25 11.60X 77.248 77.062
From Table 6.1, we note that the weight quantization offers significant storage size
reduction and execution speedups across all ML models studied here. Furthermore, except
for VGG19, the degradation in classification accuracy is minimal.
6.2 Impact of Memory Faults on the Quantized Models
In this section, we evaluate the reliability of FP32 and INT8 ML models when memory
faults occur. We quantify the reliability of an ML model by observing the classification
accuracy. To do so, we focus on the images correctly classified during a baseline (fault-free)
execution run. We use validation images from ImageNet dataset [115].
6.2.1 Fault Model
The convolution layers in the image classifier ML models are computationally important
layers. Therefore, we focus on the faults in the convolution layers. Specifically, we inject
faults in the weights of the convolution layers. We select a random weight element from
a random convolution layer of the ML model under study. In the selected weight element
we randomly flip two bits irrespective of the data type of the weight element. The faults
are modeled as permanent faults. To meet the statistical significance, we execute 3000
fault injection runs [62, 33, 88].
6.2.2 Impact of Memory Faults
Figure 6.1 illustrates a histogram to demonstrate the impact of memory faults on the
classification accuracy of FP32 and INT8 AlexNet models. In Figure 6.1, the x-axis
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represents the percentage of mis-classifications per execution run. The bin size on the
x-axis is 0.25%. On the y-axis, we plot the number of execution runs corresponding to the
percentage of mis-classifications on the x-axis.
(a) FP32 (b) INT8
Figure 6.1: Impact of faults in a weight element on the classification accuracy in FP32
and quantized (INT8) AlexNet model.
In Figure 6.1, for FP32 model, we note that around 90% (2690 out of 3000) of execution
runs experience a negligible percentage of mis-classifications (at most 2.5%) when the faults
are injected in a weight element. In contrast to the FP32 model, for the weight quantized
INT8 ML model, only around 33.4% (1002 out of 3000) of execution runs experience a
very low percentage of mis-classifications. Around 66.7% of execution runs experience
more than 2.5% of mis-classifications. Therefore, we conclude that the weight quantized
(INT8) ML model is more vulnerable to the faults in the weights compared to the FP32
ML model.
Next, we identify the convolution layers most vulnerable to the faults. To this end, we
segregate the fault injected execution runs in Figure 6.1 based on in which layer the faults
were injected. Figure 6.2 illustrates the impact of faults on the classification accuracy
for the individual convolution layers of AlexNet when selected fault injection. For both –
FP32 and INT8 – models, we note that when the faults occur in the earlier convolution
layers, the probability of mis-classification is higher as compared to when the faults occur
in the latter layers. Therefore, we conclude that the earlier layers of an ML model should
be prioritized for reliability protection.
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(a) FP32
(b) INT8
Figure 6.2: Contribution of faults in weights of different convolution layers of float 32
(FP32) and quantized (INT8) ML models on the classification accuracy.
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The future work may consider exploring different low-overhead reliability techniques
to improve the resiliency of the weight quantized ML models.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Research
Directions
7.1 Summary of Dissertation Contributions
GPUs exploit the inherent parallelism in applications to offer significant performance and
power efficiency benefits over CPUs. As a result, GPUs are being increasingly deployed
across a wide range of applications, such as financial computing, machine learning, medical
imaging. Most of the aforementioned applications process confidential information, for
example, encryption keys, user medical/financial data, etc. Furthermore, GPUs are also
deployed in critical applications, such as self-driving cars, scientific computing, etc. These
applications demand reliable compute operations on GPUs as faulty computations could
lead to either fatalities or loss of resources. Consequently, our research focuses on secure
and reliable GPU computations. To this end, we make the following contributions:
1. Improving GPU Security
For GPU security, our research focuses on mitigating a previously demonstrated cor-
relation timing attack on GPUs. The attack exploited the deterministic nature of the
memory access coalescing in GPUs to correlate the number of accesses and the execution
time to recover the AES encryption keys. We introduce two hardware-based defense mech-
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anisms to prevent the leakage of confidential data due to the correlation timing attack.
Our first defense mechanism, RCoal, randomizes the GPU coalescing mechanism so
that a random number of memory accesses are generated which in turn makes the execution
time unpredictable. Consequently, an attacker cannot correlate the number of accesses
and the execution time, thus fails to recover the AES encryption keys. We evaluate RCoal
scheme through the theoretical and empirical analysis to demonstrate that RCoal mitigates
the correlation timing analysis. Furthermore, RCoal offers a tradeoff between the desired
security and performance overhead.
While RCoal improves the GPU security against the correlation timing attack, it also
incurs a high performance overhead as RCoal disables caches and miss-status holding
registers (MSHRs) for security. To address the performance loss of RCoal, we introduce a
bucketing-based coalescing mechanism, BCoal. BCoal always generates a constant number
of accesses, termed as a bucket, by padding the original number of accesses with additional
accesses whenever necessary. Additionally, BCoal generates the padded accesses such that
the memory optimizations performed by the caches and MSHRs do not affect the security
offered adversely. Consequently, BCoal offers security against the correlation timing attack
with a minimal performance overhead. Our theoretical and empirical analysis show that
BCoal successfully thwarts the correlation timing attack. BCoal also provides a tradeoff
between the security and performance overhead, which can be set by the user.
2. Improving GPU Reliability
For GPU reliability, our research focuses on addressing the multi-bit data memory
faults in the L2 cache and DRAMs while incurring a low performance overhead. To
this end, we adopt a data-centric approach, wherein a user can decide the data memory
coverage of the reliability scheme based on the desired performance overhead. We begin
with application profiling to identify the fraction of the data memory highly accessed
and shared across GPU threads. We call this highly accessed and shared memory as
hot memory. We, furthermore, note that the memory footprint of the hot memory is
very small compared to the rest of the application memory. Using the fault injection
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simulations, We demonstrate that the memory faults in the hot memory will more likely
result in GPU output corruption as compared to the memory faults in the rest of the
memory. Consequently, we prioritize the hot memory for reliability protection. To this
end, we propose two reliability schemes, detection-only and detection-and-correction, to
address the memory faults. Both our reliability schemes offer a tradeoff between the
desired reliability and performance overhead.
7.2 Future Research Directions
The machine learning (ML) applications are deployed in different applications, such as
medical imaging and self-driving cars. These applications demand protection against
attacks that may steal confidential data, such as patient details. Furthermore, the afore-
mentioned applications need a reliability guarantee to ensure correct application output,
for example, in a self-driving car. As a result, the security and reliability aspects of the
ML applications are now leading research challenges.
On the security front, innovative attacks are launched against the hardware accelera-
tors, such as GPU, to steal the private user information processed by the ML applications
and the proprietary ML model parameters. Therefore, to improve the security of ML
applications the following questions should be considered:
• What are the software and hardware vulnerabilities of ML applications that an
attacker can exploit to launch an attack?
• How to mitigate the attacks on the ML applications while maintaining low perfor-
mance overhead?
On the reliability front, the reliability of ML applications could be studied in light
of different optimizations applied to the ML models to speedup their execution time and
reduce their storage size. The baseline (unoptimized) ML models are usually quite resilient
to the faults. However, the model optimizations, such as weight quantizations, can make
the ML applications more vulnerable to the faults in the weight elements of the ML
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model. Consequently, following questions are raised in regards to the reliability of the ML
applications:
• How to quantify the adverse effects of different model optimizations, such as weight
quantization and pruning, on the reliability of ML applications?
• How to improve the reliability of ML applications when different model optimizations
are applied to the underlying ML models?
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